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Judicial citation of foreign law worries many people,
including justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, politicians, and
legal academics. The critics in the United States argue that
judges "cherry-pick" foreign citations and use them to import
foreign norms that do not accord with the Constitution or the
will of the American people. This Article argues, based on
insights from organizational theory, that the critics overlook
another, much greater, concern: the danger does not come from
citing or looking at foreign law, but rather, from other types of
interaction, such as meetings at judicial organizations, judicial
delegations, or judicial conferences. The result of these
transnational judicial interactions will be convergence on
certain practices of courts, especially in the way courts
understand their national roles, the ways they present
themselves to their national audiences, and the methods they
use to do so. The adoption of these similar practices across
national borders is likely to distance the courts from their
national audiences and cause courts to lose their national
support.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts and justices around the world are involved in
transnational interactions with their foreign colleagues. They meet
with each other, send e-mails, and cite each other's decisions. Many
scholars, politicians, and justices criticize this phenomenon. The
critics argue that it is not useful and not legitimate for courts to use
foreign law. The main arguments focus on the cherry-picking of
foreign legal sources that courts refer to and the court's use of those
sources to import legal norms that do not accord with the will of the
people. The adoption of such norms is therefore claimed to be non-
democratic and disruptive to the national legal system. This Article
uses concepts from organizational theory and argues that courts'
transnational engagement raises other and more pressing concerns.
The Article focuses on supreme, constitutional, and highest
courts and argues that the increasing communication between judges
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in different national, regional, and international jurisdictions-what
is often called the transnational judicial dialogue-may be expected
to influence these courts. Accordingly, the Article contends that these
interactions create special relationships between courts. In terms of
organizational theory, the courts have become a transnational
organizational field. Thus, they see each other as fulfilling similar
roles in their jurisdictions and thus as their reference group (i.e., the
group to which they should compare themselves).
As a result of the emergence of this organizational field, certain
"field level" processes affect the courts. This Article will focus on one
of those processes-the process of institutional isomorphism through
which courts become similar (and sometimes different) over time. The
focus here is on specific and important characteristics of the courts-
the ways courts understand their national roles (their identities), the
ways courts want others to understand their roles (their intended
images), and the means courts use to communicate these messages.
This Article will argue that due to transnational influence courts may
be expected to act on and look at these issues in a similar way.
This convergence, it will be claimed, is likely to have negative
implications for courts. It is expected to distance them from at least
some of their national audiences. To clarify, courts' audiences, as
referred to in this Article, may be any social group or institution that
is directly or indirectly affected by the courts' decisions. For example,
a court's audience may be the legislative or the executive branch, the
public, a racial or socioeconomic group, a specific organization, or the
legal academe.1 Courts are also likely to have different relationships
with their different audiences. The result of the rift between courts
and their audiences, at least between courts and some of their
audiences, is expected to decrease courts' social legitimacy. Thus,
because courts have neither purses nor swords,2 they are likely to
1. There are a number of approaches to the question of who courts' audiences
are. See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Audiences and Reputation:
Perspectives from Comparative Law, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451, 453 (2009)
(distinguishing between courts' internal audiences within the judiciary and external
audiences (lawyers, the media, the general public) and arguing that the importance of
each of these audiences to courts depends on different characteristics of the legal
system); Amnon Reichman, The Dimensions of Law: Judicial Craft, Its Public
Perception, and the Role of the Scholar, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1619, 1625 (2007) (arguing
that the public is not a single monolithic group and that courts' audiences are divided
into a variety of professional communities, each with its own logic.). See generally
LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES (2008) (claiming that judicial
audiences consist of a large number of influential groups that include, among others,
the general public, other government branches, social groups, professional groups,
policy groups, and the news media).
2. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (implying that courts do
not control the treasury ("the purse") and do not have the power to enforce their
decisions by themselves ("the sword"); thus, courts have to convince the executive to
enforce their decisions).
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experience more backlashes, and as a result, the chance that their
unpopular decisions will be enforced will decrease.
The Article unfolds as follows: Part II addresses the existing
literature on transnational judicial interactions. Part III discusses
the theory behind the concept of an organizational field. Part IV
provides evidence that a transnational organizational field of courts is
emerging. Part V turns to discussing the process of institutional
isomorphism. It begins by providing the theoretical background to the
concept and then turns to applying this theory to courts. Part VI
discusses the normative concerns that arise from institutional
isomorphism among courts. Part VII concludes and ties the
discussion here to other concerns regarding the phenomenon of
transnational judicial dialogue that have already been raised in the
literature.
II. TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL DIALOGUE
Transnational judicial dialogue is the most common
manifestation of the globalization of courts, in the framework of
which judges and courts as institutions interact with each other
above, below, and through borders.3 For example, national judges
meet or cite judges from another national jurisdiction, regional
judges, or international judges. This phenomenon is currently at the
forefront of current discussions and controversies. 4The idea that
judges from different countries engage in a conversation with each
other-through meetings or cross citation-is an occurrence that
intrigues many observers.
5
In the United States, some scholars, politicians, and judges
publicly object to cross citation of foreign law.6 Their critique focuses
3. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103,
1104 (2000).
4. The phenomenon has additional names, such as "transjudicial dialogue,"
"community of courts," "judicial globalization," "judicial comity," "dialogue among
courts," "constitutional dialogue." See, e.g., Carl Baudenbacher, Judicial Globalization:
New Development or Old Wine in New Bottles?, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 505, 505 (2003);
Maria Rosaria Ferrarese, When National Actors Become Transnational: Transjudicial
Dialogue Between Democracy and Constitutionalism, 9 GLOBAL JURIST (2009),
http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol9/issl/art2 [http://perma.ccUMJ2-5A7D] (archived Oct.
10, 2015); Michal Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts: A
Study in Foreign Persuasive Authority 13 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
European University Institute) (on file with the author).
5. For a discussion of whether this phenomenon is new, see Baudenbacher,
supra note 4.
6. For a short description of the controversy, see RICHARD A. POSNER, How
JUDGES THINK 347-68 (2008); Francine Banner, Ken Miller & Doris Marie Provine,
Foreign Law in American Jurisprudence, in GLOBALIZING JUSTICE 27, 29-32 (Donald
W. Jackson, Michael C. Tolley & Mary L. Volcansek eds., 2010); Vlad Perju,
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on three main problems regarding the use of foreign law. The first
concerns the relevancy of foreign law. Foreign law should not be
consulted, so it is claimed, because the differences between the
countries and their legal systems make their experiences irrelevant.
Second, some object to the use of foreign citations because it is open to
manipulation, and these individuals claim that judges merely pick
foreign examples that fit their objectives. Third, it is argued that the
use of foreign law is not legitimate because it expands judicial
discretion and in fact constitutes the importation of legal norms that
were not enacted by the national democratic institutions.7 Others
present arguments supporting the use of foreign law and explain why
it is important for judges to engage with each other.8 Nevertheless, to
date, scholars have not explored or theorized the effects or the
desirability of such dialogue.
The use of the term "transnational judicial dialogue" by scholars
usually refers to two things: (1) direct interaction between judges,
and (2) citation of foreign opinions in national court decisions. Direct
interaction can be achieved through face-to-face communication as
Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing, and Migrations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1304, 1322 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andrks Saj6 eds.,
2012); Michel Rosenfeld, Comparative Constitutional Analysis in United States
Adjudication and Scholarship, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 38 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andrds Saj6 eds., 2012); Norman
Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in US Constitutional Cases: A
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J.
CON. L. 519 (2005); David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652,
653-57 (2005); David S. Law, Judicial Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 927 (2015) [hereinafter Law, Judicial Comparativism]; Sanford Levinson,
Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some Reflections, 39 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 353 (2003); Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the
Federal Courts, 98 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 305 (2004); Judith Resnik, Law's Migration:
American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry,
115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1567 (2006); and Lisa Sofio, Recent Developments in the Debate
Concerning the Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 131 (2006). The practice, such as cross-citation by the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR), is also criticized outside the United States. See Carla M.
Zoethout, The Dilemma of Constitutional Comparativism, 71 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L.
787, 803-05 (2011) (criticizing the practice of the European Court of Human Rights,
which uses foreign law as the basis of decisions without explaining why foreign law
was decisive in the particular case).
7. Adam Shinar & Anna Su, Religious Law as Foreign Law in Constitutional
Interpretation, 11 I-CON 74, 77-82 (2013).
8. One reason for supporting judicial dialogue is that it provides judges with
the opportunity to learn from the experience of other judges. See, e.g., Guy Canivet,
Trans-Judicial Dialogue in a Global World, in HIGHEST COURTS AND GLOBALIZATION
21, 29-30 (Sam Muller & Sidney Richards eds., 2010); A. Usacka, Globalization of the
Judiciary: Ways of Interaction, in HIGHEST COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF
LAW 139, 144 (Sam Muller & Marc Loth eds., 2009); Jeremy Waldron, The Theoretical
Basis of the Demand for Legal Unity, in HIGHEST COURTS AND GLOBALIZATION 99, 101-
04 (Sam Muller & Sidney Richards eds., 2010).
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well as through Information Technology (IT) facilities.9 Face-to-face
communication can occur in different settings. The most common way
for judges to meet is at conferences or in judicial delegations from one
national court to another. In those situations, judges have an
opportunity to talk to each other about their judicial work and their
judicial opinions. The other mode of judicial dialogue is the citation of
foreign opinions by national judges. 10 Judges around the world
sometimes cite foreign decisions when those decisions are
mandatory-for example, when applying an international rule or
deciding in a conflict of laws case. At other times, judges are not
obliged to cite the foreign cases, but nonetheless choose to do so. This
can happen when the citations are advisable, and judges are
explicitly allowed to look at foreign law, but not obliged to do so. It
can also happen when the citations are discretionary, when there are
no instructions regarding the use of foreign law, and when the judges
choose to do so because it is useful.1
A few scholars have tried to conceptualize and theorize the
transnational judicial dialogue. These conceptualizations are
important for understanding the implications of the transnational
interaction for both courts and national legal systems. One theory
sees the courts as belonging to a single global community,12 one that
is possibly an epistemic community.13 According to this view, courts,
or at least some of them, constitute a group that has common goals
and acts together to achieve those goals. In many cases, this
9. See Monica Claes & Maartje de Visser, Are You Networked Yet? On
Dialogues in European Judicial Networks, 8 UTRECHT L. REV. 100, 109-10 (2012)
(discussing the working of the horizontal European judicial networks).
10. The idea that cross-citations are a means of communication can be
criticized. It is not obvious that citations are used for communication with other courts.
Currently, the reasons for the use of foreign citations are not yet fully explored. For one
possible explanation, see Erik Voeten, Borrowing and Nonborrowing among
International Courts, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 547 (2010) (suggesting that judges cite foreign
opinions for strategic reasons). For the purposes of this Article, the exact reasons for
the citations are not important, and they are used as one indicator for the relationships
between courts.
11. See Bobek, supra note 4, at 25-26. Cf. Martin Gelter & Mathias Siems,
Networks, Dialogue or One-Way Traffic? An Empirical Analysis of Cross-Citations
Between Ten of Europe's Highest Courts, 8 UTRECHT L. REV. 88, 89-91 (2012) (dividing
cross-citation into three types: (1) case history and jurisdiction; (2) international or
European law; and (3) purely comparative reasons).
12. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J.
191 (2003).
13. Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic
Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law: A Rejoinder to Nikolaos Lavranos,
Jacob Katz Cogan and Tom Ginsburg, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1027, 1029 (2010); Antje
Wiener & Philip Liste, Lost Without Translations? Cross-Referencing and a New Global
Community of Courts, 21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (2014).
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community can be conceptualized as a network,14 and therefore the
relationships between courts should be analyzed through the
analytical tools used to understand networks. These analytical tools
provide a map of courts' interactions, focusing on why and how
cooperation and interaction between courts take place. 15
Nevertheless, the current approaches are not fully developed and
provide only a starting point for analyzing the phenomenon of
transnational judicial dialogue and its influence on courts. They do
not map all of the relationships between courts or explain in full how
those relationships affect courts.
The next Part follows an argument I have made elsewhere and
proposes to use the concept of organizational field for analyzing the
transnational relationships among courts and their influences on
courts.16 The concept of organizational field highlights the ways in
which the transnational judicial dialogue influence the courts.
Therefore, this concept may be used not only for mapping and
identifying the phenomenon of transnational judicial dialogue, but
also for understanding the influence it has on courts, more
specifically how it may disrupt the relationships of courts with their
national audiences and lead to the loss of national legitimacy. Before
discussing the influence of the transnational judicial dialogue on
courts, this Article now turns to introducing the concept of
organizational field, which will be used in the following Parts for
analyzing the transnational influences on courts.
III. TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL FIELD OF COURTS: THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
Organizational field is a concept that was developed in the new
institutionalism approach to organizational studies. 17 Meyer and
14. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) [hereinafter
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER] (conceptualizing transnational relationships as
networks).
15. Claes & Visser, supra note 9, at 101.
16. Olga Frishman, Transnational Judicial Dialogue as an Organizational
Field, 19 EUR. L.J. 739 (2013) (arguing that transnational judicial dialogue should be
conceptualized as an organizational field).
17. See Mellissa Wooten & Andrew J. Hoffman, Organizational Fields: Past,
Present and Future, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM
130, 131 (Royston Greenwood et al. eds., 2008) (noting that in the past organizational
fields were referred to as institutional spheres, institutional fields, societal sectors, and
institutional environment); Henry L. Tosi, About Theories of Organization, in
THEORIES OF ORGANIZATION 1, 15 (Henry L. Tosi ed., 2009) (discussing the new
institutionalism approach belongs to the open systems model in organization theory);
see also JOHN L. CAMPBELL, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION 17-23 (2004).
It evolved in response to views that were accepted until the late 1970s and focused
primarily on the rational and material aspects of organizational life. New
2016]
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Rowan, in their classic 1977 article, provided an early statement of
this approach. 18 They draw attention to the way organizational
structure is modeled by "institutional rules."'9 These "institutional
rules" become "rational myths" that appear to be the rational way of
achieving the organizational goal without necessarily promoting it.
20
For example, a rational myth may be that all invoices should be
printed on blue-colored paper. Although this myth has no logical
connection to the quality of the invoice system, members of the
organization may insist on it even if yellow-colored paper would be
cheaper and easier to use. In extreme situations, following the
institutional rule becomes the end, and the connection between the
rule and the performance diminishes in importance. 21 In this
framework, conformity to institutional rules is rewarded with
increased legitimacy and reduction of uncertainty.
22
The new institutionalism approach focuses most of its
investigation of organizations at the level of organizational fields.
23
The concept of organizational field was developed by Paul DiMaggio
and Walter Powell in 1983.24 Despite the concept's growing popularity
institutionalism focuses on the causal power of culture and cognition, highlighting the
role-bound and ceremonial aspects of organizational life. See Mark C. Suchman &
Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and
Society Tradition, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 909 (1996). For a brief summary of the
history of new institutionalism, see Royston Greenwood et al., Introduction, in THE
SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 1, 5 (Royston Greenwood et
al. eds., 2008). As such, this approach concerns itself with such phenomena as social
institutions, organizational fields, institutional environments, and societal sectors. See
Greenwood et al., supra; William McKinley & Mark A. Mone, Micro and Macro
Perspectives in Organizational Theory: A Tale of Incommensurability, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 345, 361 (Haridimos Tsoukas & Christian
Knudsen eds., 2005). Although the new institutionalism approach has been criticized
for holding an ambivalent position on rationality and for loose conceptualization. See
McKinley & Mone, supra, at 364. For additional criticism, see W. Richard Scott, The
Adolescence of Institutional Theory, in THEORIES OF ORGANIZATION 215, 215 (L. Tosi
ed., 2009); W. Richard Scott, Approaching Adulthood: the Maturing of Institutional
Theory, 37 THEORY & SOCY 427 (2008) (still extensively used).
18. John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutional Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977).
19. Id. at 343-53.
20. Id. at 359-60.
21. McKinley & Mone, supra note 17, at 361.
22. Id. at 362.
23. W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: IDEAS AND
INTERESTS 85-87 (3d. ed., 2008); Trish Reay & C. R. (Bob) Hinings, The Recomposition
of an Organizational Field: Health Care in Alberta, 26 ORG. STUD. 351, 351 (2005)
(noting that, recently, institutional theory and organizational fields provide important
insights into both convergent and radical change processes); see, e.g., Gerald F. Davis &
Christopher Marquis, Prospects for Organizational Theory in the Early Twenty-First
Century, 16 ORG. SC. 332 (2005) (arguing that theory and research that takes the field,
rather than the organization, as the unit of analysis is the most appropriate style of
organizational research under conditions of major economic change).
24. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM.
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and importance,25 scholars do not yet fully agree on its definition.26
DiMaggio and Powell originally defined an organizational field as
"those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized
area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce
similar services and products."2 7 Another definition of organizational
field, by W. Richard Scott, asserts that "[t]he notion of field connotes
the existence of a community of organizations that partakes of a
common meaning system and whose participants interact more
frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside of
the field. '28 A more recent work, by Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp
Pattberg, explains that "[a]n organizational field includes
communities of organizations with similar functions or roles insofar
as these organizations are aware of each other, interact with each
other and perceive each other as peers or "like units" in some
important sense."29 It is important to note that organizations do not
need to be constructed in the same way to belong to the same
organizational field; they only need to share the same identity
statement.30 Thus, in a nutshell, an organizational field is a group of
organizations that see each other as performing similar social roles
and that influence each other in a variety of ways.
31
SOC. REV. 147 (1983) (explaining the concept of organizational field was developed
based on Bourdieu's concept of social field as well as on concepts explored by other
scholars); see also SCOTT, supra note 23, at 183-84 (describing the intellectual history
of organizational fields).
25. Davis & Marquis, supra note 23, at 337.
26. Roy Suddaby et al., Transnational Regulation of Professional Services:
Governance Dynamics of Field Level Organizational Change, 32 ACOT. ORG. & SOCY
333, 335 (2007).
27. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 24, at 148.
28. SCOTT, supra note 23, at 86.
29. Klaus Dingwerth & Philipp Pattberg, World Politics and Organizational
Fields: The Case of Transnational Sustainability Governance, 15 EUR. J. INT'L
RELATIONSHIPS 707, 720 (2009); see SCOTT, supra note 23, at 165 (noting it is important
to differentiate between similar organizations-those that "occupy similar positions in
the social structure, and those organizations that are connected to each other.
Organizations that operate in the same organizational field do not have to be connected
to each other.").
30. Dingwerth & Pattberg, supra note 29, at 738.
31. See SCOTT, supra note 23, at 185-90 (explaining that, in general, there are
four main components to the definition of organizational field: relational systems,
cultural-cognitive systems, organizational archetypes, and repertoires of collective
action). Relational systems in an organizational field have two main characteristics:
the links between organizations and the "interorganizational structures of dominance
and patterns of coalitions," meaning that there are governance systems that work at
the level of the organizational field. SCOTT, supra note 23, at 185-86; DiMaggio &
Powell, supra note 24. Thus, organizations in the field interact among themselves. In
addition, in an organizational field some organizations are more important than others.
There are also groups of organizations that tend to interact more among themselves
than with other organizations. As for cultural-cognitive systems, the second
component, DiMaggio and Powell refer to it as "the development of a mutual awareness
2016]
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Scholars havealready studied a number of organizational fields,
such as art museums in the United States 32 and healthcare
organizations in Alberta.33 Art museums in particular are a good
example of how an organizational field affects the organizations
operating in it. Not all art museums communicate directly with each
other. Nevertheless, the design of most art museums around the
United States is similar, and they are aware that all of them are a
similar kind of organization.34 This similarity between museums
developed over time. Therefore, today, even the audiences of those
organizations expect them to look a certain way: the same way as
other organizations in the same organizational field.
Belonging to an organizational field affects the organization-it
constrains as well as enables its actions. 35 For example, the
organizational field of museums may determine or limit the kinds of
collections that a museum may hold. A museum, for instance, may
decide not to hold a collection of comic books because doing so would
be contrary to what is expected from a museum. The concept of
among participants in a set of organizations that they are involved in a common
enterprise." DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 24, at 148. More recent literature has
divided this component into two main concepts. See Roger Friedland & Robert R.
Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions,
in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 232, 248 (Walter W.
Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) (explaining the first is institutional logic defined
as "a set of material practices and symbolic constructions which constitutes its
organizing principles and which is available to organizations and individuals to
elaborate"); SCOTT, supra note 23, at 186-87 (noting each organizational field has its
own institutional logic and a field's institutional logic dictates to organizations how
things "should be done" and what the acceptable and common paths of action are). The
second concept is cultural frames. It refers to how things are interpreted and
represented in the field. See SCOTT, supra note 23, at 187-88. Here, too, in different
fields, cultural frames will be different. Unlike institutional logic, cultural frames
define the ways organizations in the field should "think" about situations and how they
should understand them. The third component, organizational archetypes, describes
templates around which the rules, systems, and activities in the organizational field
are organized. In each field there are a number of ideal models for individual actors as
well as for organizations to follow. Archetypes provide baselines for evaluating the
organizations in an organizational field. See Paul J. DiMaggio, Constructing an
Organizational Field as a Professional Project: U.S. Art Museums, 1920-1940, in THE
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 267 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J.
DiMaggio eds., 1991). For example, an archetype of a museum will be an idea about
how a museum should be designed. All other museums will be compared to that
archetype. The last component, repertoires of collective action, refers to the limitations
on the options that are available to organizations in the field. As a result, each
organization in an organizational field perceives only a limited set of actions as
possible. The available actions are determined by the rules, norms, and beliefs of the
organizations in the same organizational field. See id. at 189-90.
32. See generally DiMaggio, supra note 31 (discussing how museums are often
used as an archetype for how other museums are designed).
33. Reay & Hinings, supra note 23.
34. DiMaggio, supra note 31.
35. DiMaggio, supra note 31, at 181-209; Wooten & Hoffman, supra note 17,
at 130.
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organizational field therefore incorporates parameters relevant to the
understanding of organizations, such as the ways they may or may
not behave. Not taking the concept of organizational field into
account when analyzing organizations excludes from the analysis
important parameters, such as other organizations and
organizational logics. In addition, it forestalls an investigation of
differences between organizational fields that can be conducted by
identifying their structure. It also limits the ability to study the ways
in which these structures change over time, 36 especially the
convergence and the radical change processes of organizations.
37
The concept of organizational field is useful for understanding
organizations operating on the local, national, or transnational level.
In a similar way to this Article, some recent studies have focused on
the emergence and effects of transnational organizational fields.38 For
example, Dingwerth and Pattberg have argued that in the early
1990s an organizational field of transnational rulemaking emerged in
global sustainability politics.39 The interactions among organizations
in this organizational field, according to the authors, explain their
shared set of core features, including characteristics that appear too
costly for organizations to adopt.40 Suddaby et al. have described the
creation of a transnational regulatory field in professional services,
examining how the structural boundaries, regulatory logics, and
institutional power of actors in the field have changed.41 Tim Bartley
has explored the development of the transnational organizational
field of organizations involved in forest certification.42 And Julie
Collins-Dogrul has discussed the emergence and characteristics of a
U.S.-Mexico transnational organizational field dealing with health
problems in their border areas.
43
Before turning to applying the concept of organizational field to
the transnational relationships between courts, it is necessary to
introduce structuration. Structuration is the process through which
an organizational field emerges. Although the term structuration is
also used to describe changes in the structure of organizational fields,
in this Article it will be used specifically to describe the initial
36. SCOTT, supra note 23, at 208-09.
37. Laura Cruz-Castro & Luis Sanz-Men6dez, Legitimation Models and the
Transformation of the Public Research Organizational Field, 37 INT'L STUD. MGMT. &
ORG. 27, 28 (2007).
38. SCOTT, supra note 23, at 87.
39. Dingwerth & Pattberg, supra note 29.
40. id.
41. Suddaby et al., supra note 26.
42. Tim Bartley, How Foundations Shape Social Movements: The Construction
of an Organizational Field at the Rise of Forest Certification, 54 SOC. PROBS. 229
(2007).
43. Julie Collins-Dogrul, Managing US-Mexico "Border Health" An
Organizational Field Approach, 63 SOC. SC & MED. 3199 (2006).
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emergence of the field. Historically and logically, structuration comes
before all other processes that happen at the level of the
organizational field. 44 In other words, there has to be a transnational
organizational field of courts before courts can change their behavior
and their characteristics due to these transnational influences.
Therefore, for those processes to occur, the organizational field needs
to emerge at least to a certain degree. Accordingly, to determine
whether a certain organizational field exists, one must examine the
characteristics of its structuration and establish its existence.
Structuration of an organizational field is an ongoing process.
The emergence of the field induces organizations within it to
cooperate and communicate with each other by providing rules and
resources. This cooperation and communication, in turn, sustain the
existing level of structuration and drive the organizational field
towards greater structuration.
45
DiMaggio and Powell describe the four parameters of the process
of structuration as
an increase in the extent of interaction among organizations in the field; the
emergence of sharply defined interorganizational structures of domination and
patterns of coalition; an increase in the information load with which
organizations in a field must contend; and the development of a mutual
awareness among participants in a set of organizations that they are involved
in a common enterprise.
46
The next Part turns to applying these parameters to the
transnational relationships among courts in order to establish the
emergence of a transnational organizational field of courts. After
establishing the existence of this transnational field, the Article will
turn to discussing its possible problematic influence on courts'
relationships with their different audiences.
IV. STRUCTURATION OF THE TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL FIELD
OF COURTS
The previous Part of the Article presented the theoretical
framework of the organizational field concept. This Part applies the
theoretical framework to the transnational relationships of courts
and elaborates on the argument that a new organizational field, the
44. DiMaggio, supra note, 31, at 267. The list of processes that may occur at
the field level includes, among others, the process of institutional isomorphism. This
process will be discussed later in this paper.
45. Nelson Philips, Thomas B. Lawrence & Cynthia Hardy, Inter-
Organizational Collaboration and the Dynamics of Institutional Fields, 37 J. MGMT.
STUD. 23 (2000); Wooten & Hoffman, supra note 17, at 136.
46. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note, 24, at 148.
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transnational organizational field of courts, is emerging. 47 It
discusses the elements of structuration of an organizational field and
explains how each of those elements is manifested in relation to the
transnational organizational field of courts. It shows that the
relationships between courts that result from the transnational
judicial dialogue follow most of the patterns of structuration.4 Due to
the early stage that the structuration process is currently at, the
transnational organizational field of courts satisfies some criteria of
structuration better than others. Nevertheless, the existing state of
the organizational field may already result in organizational
processes at the organizational field level, such as institutional
isomorphism. The following Parts of the Article will explain how
these processes may influence courts.
A. Increase in the Extent of Interaction among Organizations in the
Field
According to this criterion, when an organizational field is
emerging, the organizations belonging to it will communicate with
each other more than before, regardless of the reason for the increase
in interaction or what the organizations achieve by it.49 Nor do the
exact means used to communicate matter much. The communication
itself shows that the organizations identify each other as the relevant
group that they should be communicating with. This Part
demonstrates that the emerging organizational field of courts fulfills
this criterion by focusing on the different ways courts interact, the
courts that are involved in the interaction, and the issues around
which the interaction revolves.
50
There are three main ways in which courts and judges interact:5 1
face-to-face interactions, IT-based communication, and cross
citations. As mentioned above, face-to-face interactions include
judicial meetings in different settings. The most common way for
judges to meet is at conferences organized by a variety of bodies and
47. Frishman, supra note 16.
48. A similar argument can be made in regard to other, law-related,
organizational fields. For example, one could argue that there is an organizational field
of legal professionals, legal academics, or national courts. These discussions, although
important, fall outside the scope of this Article.
49. The goals and the consequences of the interaction are influential in other
criteria of structuration.
50. This Article will address only the issues that are important for its purpose.
For a list of additional issues, see Claes & Visser, supra note 9, at 100-01.
51. There are a number of different classifications of the ways courts interact.
See, e.g., Emmanuel Lazega, Mapping Judicial Dialogue Across National Borders: An
Exploratory Network Study of Learning from Lobbying Among European Intellectual
Property Judges, 8 UTRECHT L. REV. 115, 118 (2012); SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD
ORDER, supra note 14, at 192; Slaughter, supra note 3, at 1104; cf. Law, supra note 6.
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organizations. The volume of these kinds of conferences can be
illustrated by the report written by the Hague Institute for the
Internationalisation of Law. It listed thirty-two international judicial
organizations that organize judicial face-to-face interactions.5 2 Some
examples of these kinds of meetings include: meetings organized by
the International Association of Judges,53 the meeting of European
intellectual property judges, 54 meetings of the Chief Justices of
supreme courts of the European Union,55 as well as international and
regional conferences organized by the International Organization for
Judicial Training of which judges from the United States are
members. 56 In addition to judicial conferences, there are certain
academic conferences that judges from different countries attend. An
example of this kind is the Conference on Transnational Judicial
Dialogue: Concept, Method, Extent, Effects, which took place in Oslo
from June 21-22, 2013. Six judges participated at this conference:
Lord Carnwath, Judge of the UK Supreme Court; Andreas Paulus, of
the Bundesverfassungsgericht; Raffaele Sabato, of the Court of
Cassation of Italy; Luis L6pez Guerra, of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR); Erik Mose, of the ECtHR; and Angelika
Nul3berger, of the ECtHR.57 Moreover, judges meet by taking part in
judicial delegations from one court to another. They perceive these
judicial delegations as important. For example, David Law and Wen-
Chen Chang note that judges from the Taiwanese Constitutional
Court strive to take part in such delegations, despite the obstacles
52. LAW OF THE FUTURE CONFERENCE, HAGUE INST. FOR THE
INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW, THE CHANGING ROLE OF HIGHEST COURTS IN AN
INTERNATIONAL WORLD: INVENTORY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 63-70 (2008) [hereinafter
FUTURE CONFERENCE], http://www.hiil.org/data/sitemanagement/media/Highest-
courts-ac2008_inventorybibliography.pdf [http://perma.cc/G76L-NFW6] (archived Oct.
10, 2015). The Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law organized judicial
meetings. See Michael Kirby, Transnational, Judicial Dialogue, Internationalisation of
Law and Australian Judges, 9 MELB. J. INT'L L. 171 (2008).
53. News & Events, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF JUDGES, http://www.iaj-
uim.org/news/ [http://perma.cc/MA5H-5BHK] (archived Oct. 28, 2015).
54. Lazega, supra note 51.
55. GUY CANIVET, New Methods for the International Coherency of Law, in
HIGHEST COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW 145, 150 (Sam Muller &
Marc Loth eds., 2009).
56. THE INT'L ORG. FOR JUD. TRAINING, http://www.iojt.org/
[http://perma.cc/S9VB-E3BH] (archived Sept. 28, 2015) ("The mission of the IOJT is
realized through international and regional conferences and other exchanges that
provide opportunities for judges and judicial educators to discuss strategies for
establishing and developing training centers, design effective curricula, developing
faculty capacity, and improving teaching methodology.").
57. Conference on Transnational Judicial Dialogue: Concept, Method, Extent,
Effects, UIO, http://www.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/projects/multirights/events/
2013/annual-conference-2013.html [http://perma.cc/32J5-VTE4] (archived Oct. 10,
2015).
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they face.58 Moreover, some judges even participate in exchange
programs where a judge from one jurisdiction spends time and gets
training in another jurisdiction.59
A second method of judicial communication is through
technology (e.g., through the Internet or the telephone). Judges use
technology to talk to each other or to read each other's decisions. Of
course, communication through the medium of "decisions-reading" is
different from a conversation. Nevertheless it is still a way to
communicate-a judge can write in a way that transmits a certain
message to the judges who read her decision. The judge who reads the
decisions decides whose and which decisions she wants to read. As a
result, the judge decides whose messages she wishes to receive. By
making their decisions accessible on their website and by translating
them to other languages, courts can send specific messages such as
what they believe to be the best solution for a certain situation.
Technology used for judicial communication of this sort includes
general legal databases such as LexisNexis60 and Westlaw61 and
specific databases such as the "international law in domestic courts"
database.62 All of these databases include judicial decisions from
different jurisdictions. Although subscribing to some of these
databases may be costly and therefore some judges will have only
limited access to them, others are free and publicly available. In
addition, communication through technology includes online forums
open only to particular judges, where judges can write to each other
directly. 63 With the development of new technologies and the
lowering costs of existing technologies, it is likely that additional
databases and methods of communication will be developed.
The third kind of judicial interaction occurs through cross
citation. As mentioned in the Introduction, this type of interaction is
58. David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Transnational Judicial
Dialogue, 86 WASH. L. REV. 523, 523 (2011); see also Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong
Yeh, Internationalization of Constitutional Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1165 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andris Saj6 eds., 2012);
cf. Law & Chang, supra (analyzing the involvement of justices from the Supreme Court
of Japan, the Constitutional Court of Korea, and the Constitutional Court of Taiwan in
different practices of transnational judicial dialogue).
59. See, e.g., Exchange 2013, ACA EUROPE, http://www.juradmin.elindex.phpl
en/exchanges/2013 (last visited Oct. 10, 2015) [http://perma.cc/GFN6-RU3D] (archived
Sept. 28, 2015) (providing a table showing judges exchanging foreign jurisdictions).
60. LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2015).
61. WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2015).
62. Domestic Court Decisions, OXFORD REPORTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAw,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/search?ct=6f151ede-c53f-4613-8bea-f62aO76a1355 (last visited
Oct. 10, 2015).
63. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of
Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 263 (2008)
(describing the benefits judges or decision makers gain from access to a members-only
online database).
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sometimes considered normatively problematic due to the possible
influence on national law. 64 In the literature, cross citation is
conceptualized as a "dialogue," "intellectual interaction," or a mutual
judicial communication, and not merely as legal "borrowing." It is
considered to be not just a direct application of foreign law65 or a
situation where there is a clear-cut division between "importers" and
"exporters" of law, 66 but a way for courts to exchange their
understandings of the best legal solution to a certain problem. The
literature divides the judicial dialogue through cross citation into two
categories. The first category is a weak form of judicial dialogue,
where judges take inspiration from foreign decisions when making
their decisions. The second category, although rare, is a strong form
of judicial dialogue, where judges use foreign decisions as precedent.
67
Although complete empirical data on cross citation are lacking, there
are indications that cross citation is increasing in numbers around
the world, especially in areas concerning global or regional issues
that require the courts' cooperation.
68
64. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 6, at 347-68 (discussing when it is
appropriate for judges to cite foreign courts); see also Scalia, supra note 6 (discussing
the impact of foreign comparative law on the U.S. Constitution). This Article argues
that another type of influences on the courts is of graver concern than the possible
importation of foreign law. The reason is that unlike the importation of foreign law,
which is made willingly by national judges, transnational judicial dialogue may cause
judges and courts to change their behavior in a way that they are not aware of.
65. Sir Basil Markesinis & Jorg Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist, 80 TUL. L.
REV. 11, 17 (2005). I believe that there should be a stronger analytical distinction
between cross-citation and other means of engaging in judicial dialogue. This point will
be developed in another work. For the purpose of the argument here, it suffices to
address all kinds of communication in the same way.
66. Ferrarese, supra note 4, at 5.
67. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., "I'd Like to Teach the World to Sing (in
Perfect Harmony)" International Judicial Dialogue and the Muses-Reflections on the
Perils and the Promise of International Judicial Dialogue, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1321,
1324 (2006) (explaining that foreign legal precedent has been used in support of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions and that this use of precedent demonstrates one aspect of
international judicial dialogue).
68. The claim that there is an increase in cross-citation and in judicial
interactions in general is supported by anecdotal evidence. See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra
note 63; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication,
29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 103-12 (1994) (discussing three forms of transjudicial
communication: horizontal, vertical, and mixed vertical-horizontal). The first extensive
account of the use constitutional courts make of foreign law was published in 2013. See
THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES (Tania Groppi &
Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013) (finding that some courts tend to cite foreign law
more than others-in most cases, according to the authors, courts from a common law
background will tend to cite more foreign law than courts from a civil law background).
See generally Ryan C. Black et al., Upending a Global Debate: An Empirical Analysis of
the U.S. Supreme Court's Use of Transnational Law to Interpret Domestic Doctrine, 103
GEO. L.J. 1 (2014) (analyzing empirically the use of transnational law for interpreting
domestic law by the U.S. Supreme Court).
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The different types of interaction -can occur between courts on
different levels. These interactions are both vertical and horizontal.
69
Vertical interaction-voluntary or mandatory 70 -includes
communication between regional or international courts and national
courts, for example, the interaction between national courts in
Europe and the Court of Justice of the European Union or the
European Court of Human Rights. 71 Horizontal communication
includes interactions between courts on the same level, such as
between the highest courts of different countries.
72
Moreover, some courts take part in judicial communication more
than others. For example, courts from new democracies tend to cross
cite more often than older courts.73 Courts in new democracies will
tend to cross cite more because it helps them establish their authority
and to convince the other branches that they are experts in law.
Regional networks also promote horizontal communication. Courts in
some regions, such as the European Union, have a stronger incentive
to interact with each other. Regional integration requires them to
deal with similar problems and address the same legal documents
(documents on the regional level). As a result, the courts of countries
belonging to the European Union have an incentive to develop a
common understanding of European law and create a legal system
that all national courts in Europe find acceptable.74 The referral of a
preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice is an example of a way in
which courts can act together to create this common understanding.
Of course, other methods such as direct communication, discussed
above, can promote similar goals.
69. See Slaughter, supra note 3, at 1104 (noting that judicial globalization can
involve "both 'vertical' relations between national and international tribunals and
'horizontal' relations across national borders").
70. Id. As for other types of cross-citation, there are situations that the
national law requires courts to look at the decisions of supra-national courts. For
example, when they apply already established supra-national aw. In other cases, such
as when there supra-national court's decision are in similar situation but not an exact
one, courts can look at this decision voluntarily.
71. Id.
72. For an empirical analysis of horizontal communication between the
highest courts in the European Union, see generally Martin Gelter & Mathias M.
Siems, Language, Legal Origins, and Culture Before the Courts: Cross-Citations
Between Supreme Courts in Europe, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 215 (2013).
73. Chang & Yeh, supra note 58, at 1175; see also Antonie Hol, Highest Courts
and Transnational Interaction: Introductory and Concluding Remarks, 8 UTRECHT L.
REV. 1, 5 (2012) ("[C]ourts in countries with new democracies, such as South Africa and
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, are more open to foreign law than the
courts of other countries.").
74. See Hol, supra note 73, at 5; see also Diana Piana & Carlo Guarnieri,
Bringing the Outside Inside: Macro and Micro Factors to Put the Dialogue Among
Highest Courts into Its Right Context, 8 UTRECHT L. REV. 139, 140 (2012) (explaining
that European domestic courts are inclined to engage in a pattern of dialogue by citing
to other foreign case law).
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The topics discussed in these judicial interactions are also
important for understanding these interactions. Sometimes judges
share thoughts about institutional and organizational subjects, such
as judicial independence, efficiency, and high-quality justice.75 At
other times, judges communicate about specific matters that concern
transnational problems or common issues that courts need to deal
with on the national level. For example, courts communicate on
issues such as judicial review of counterterrorism measures,
protection of the environment, asylum seekers, 76 intellectual
property,77 and constitutional questions.78 A third option is "judicial
comity," that is, when judges interact in order to resolve a particular
transnational case and minimize forum shopping by the parties.
79
As has been discussed in this section, nowadays courts interact
with each other extensively. The communication between courts
fulfills the first criterion of structuration and is therefore a strong
indicator for the emergence of a transnational organizational field of
courts.
B. Emergence of a Sharply Defined Interorganizational Structure of
Domination and Pattern of Coalition
In an organizational field there are distinct hierarchies and
coalitions between organizations. For example, some organizations
are considered to be leading organizations, while others are not; some
are more dominant and legitimate than others; some are disregarded
as irrelevant. Thus, one can identify the status of an organization in
comparison to others. With regard to courts, the argument is that a
defined interorganizational structure emerges. This structure defines
the status of each court in comparison to other courts, determines
coalitions of courts, and indicates which courts are considered to be
prestigious. At the current level of structuration of the transnational
organizational field of courts, no clear and defined patterns of
domination have thus far been established. Nevertheless, it is
possible to identify, to a certain extent, the inception of such patterns.
For example, Martin Gelter and Mathias Siems have identified
75. Claes & Visser, supra note 9, at 110-11.
76. See Benvenisti, supra note 63, at 253 (discussing inter-judicial cooperation
in the areas of global counterterrorism measures, the protection of the environment
and the status of asylum seekers).
77. See generally Lazega, supra note 51.
78. VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL
ERA 1-15 (2010).
79. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 708, 709
(1998) (explaining how judicial comity helps courts work in harmony).
SHOULD COURTS FEAR TRANSNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT?
coalitions among courts in the European Union.80 It isalso possible to
spot the first indications regarding which courts are more important
than others, and to distinguish between courts that belong to the
center of the field and those that belong at its periphery, on all issues
or only on some of them.
The status of a court is not determined merely by its official role.
Courts that have an official rank, such as regional courts, may adjust
their behavior in order to comply with what lower (national) courts
expect of them. Regional courts, such as the courts of the European
Union, may communicate with national courts as equals and
sometimes adjust their decisions' bottom line or rhetoric according to
their audiences. For example, the European Court of Human Rights
adjusts some of its rhetoric (i.e., the number of citations used),
according to the country that its decision refers to.
81
It is important to remember that a court's position is not
necessarily the same in relation to all courts in the field, but
sometimes only in relation to other courts in a certain group (such as
a group of courts in the same region). The reason why such subgroups
among courts exist is that the relationships between courts in the
organizational field differ. Some courts are more connected between
themselves than with other courts. This may be the result of
belonging to the same transnational space (such as the same region)
82
or to legal systems that have strong historical or structural
relationships (such as common law systems).8 3 One can identify and
analyze groups of courts, to a certain extent, through cross citations.
84
Usually, courts that cite each other more often than they cite other
80. See Gelter & Siems, supra note 72, at 241 (identifying groups of courts by
using cluster analysis).
81. See, e.g., Yonatan Lupu & Erik Voeten, Precedent in International Courts:
A Network Analysis of Case Citations by the European Court of Human Rights, 42
BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 413, 413 (2012) (suggesting that international courts adjust case
citations to the demands of their audiences).
82. See Piana & Guarnieri, supra note 74, at 151 ("Courts are more inclined to
refer to a precedent decided by a foreign court which belongs to its own transnational
legal space .... ).
83. Hol, supra note 73, at 3.
84. Using cross-citation is an acceptable way to identify relationships between
courts. There are some problems with this criterion; for the purpose of this Article, the
main problem is that some courts use foreign decisions without openly citing them. For
example, the French Court of Cassation does not openly cite foreign decisions. See
Canivet, supra note 55, at 147-48. Nevertheless, this is currently the most useful tool
for measuring judicial dialogue. I therefore use it in this Article, while keeping in mind
its limitations. For a discussion of the correlation between the amount of citations a
court is accorded, and its other transnational judicial relationships, see Law & Chang,
supra note 58.
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courts will belong to the same subgroup. For this purpose, one can
use methods such as network analysis.
85
Citation patterns of foreign law may be used to reveal the status
of a specific court.86 While the full argument will be developed
elsewhere, I next provide a brief explanation about the way citation
patterns can be used to understand the status of different courts. For
example, leading courts are those that other courts look up to when
they are considering how to decide or behave in a certain situation. It
is therefore safe to assume that when a court has a leading position,
other courts will cite it extensively.8 7 Its decisions will be cited to a
larger extent than decisions by more marginal courts and will
frequently be the only comparative citation. Moreover, leading courts
will rarely cross cite other courts in their decisions because they will
not need to use foreign support to establish the legitimacy of their
decisions. These trends can be identified in the behavior of the U.S.
Supreme Court and of the Constitutional Court of Germany.
88
Courts that have a weak position in the field will tend to cite the
leading courts, because they perceive those citations as increasing the
legitimacy of their own decisions.8 9 For example, the Supreme Court
of Ireland frequently cites decisions by the Supreme Court of the
85. Network analysis is a tool increasingly used in the natural and social
sciences. The basic purpose of network analysis is to map the relationships among
actors or items in a network and to measure the latent positions these actors or items
occupy in the network. Researchers have used this method of analysis to evaluate the
nature of social interactions and, for example, to identify key individuals who
communicate most extensively with others. See, e.g., JEROEN BRUGGEMAN, SOCIAL
NETWORK: AN INTRODUCTION (2008); PETER J. CARRINGTON ET AL., MODELS AND
METHODS IN SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS (2005); STANLEY WASSERMAN & KATHERINE
FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: METHODS AND APPLICATIONS (1994). For the
application of social network analysis to the U.S. judiciary, see Frank B. Cross et al.,
Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of their Use and Significance,
2010 U. ILL L. REV. 489, 523 (2010489, 523 (2010) (explaining that network analysis
has been used to examine the relationships between court cases); Daniel M. Katz &
Derek K. Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social Network Analysis of the American Federal
Judiciary, 71 OHIO ST. L. J. 457, 464 (2010) ("[N]etwork analysis should illuminate the
social structure of the federal judiciary."); Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 309, 346 (2007) (explaining that network analysis can show which cases
and articles judges find significant).
86. Cf. Law, supra note 68 (discussing judicial diplomacy of East Asian courts
and examining the ways they are involved in transnational judicial dialogue and the
non-legal goals of this involvement).
87. See generally Gelter & Siems, supra note 72 (addressing frequently cited
courts as leading courts).
88. Chang & Yeh, supra note 58, at 1176.
89. There are additional reasons why courts, especially in new democracies,
may cite foreign law. These reasons may be connected more to the national sphere than
to the international sphere. See Johanna Kalb, The Judicial Role in New Democracies:
A Strategic Account of Comparative Citation, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 423, 428-29 (2013)
(discussing how foreign citations are used not only a tool of judicial autonomy but also
a democratic tool used to allow political bodies to reflect majoritarian preferences).
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United Kingdom, and the Constitutional Court of Austria frequently
cites decisions of the Constitutional Court of Germany.90 Another
example is the extensive citation of European and international
human rights case law by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights.
91
In addition to identifying leading courts, through cross citation it
is possible to identify courts that are attempting to improve their own
status and become leading courts. Of course, it should be kept in
mind that cross citation patterns are merely one indication of courts'
statuses, and there may be many others. Cross citation patterns of
courts that are attempting to improve their status will be different
from those of leading courts and low-status courts. They will cite a
large number of courts, both leading and low-status, without
distinguishing between them, thereby trying to show the cited courts
that they are taking their opinions into consideration and that they
respect them. This in turn should improve the position of the citing
court in the eyes of the cited courts. Madhav Khosla has argued that
this explains the Supreme Court of India's cross citation pattern in
the Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi 92 case. 93
According to Khosla, the case provides an example of the use of cross
citations in a way that is indicative of an attempt to improve the
court's status and position it as a "leader" within Asia.94 The case
addressed the constitutionality of the criminal prohibition on sodomy
and cited an unlikely range of courts, including not only leading
courts, but also courts not considered to be leading or important on
the transnational evel, from countries such as Fiji and Nepal-courts
that are usually ignored.95 Of course, as will be explained next, courts
may have additional reasons for citing decisions of specific courts.
There are many parameters that influence the relative status of
a certain court, a status that as explained above can sometimes be
identified through cross citation patterns. One of these parameters is
the reputation of the court. Courts will usually cite other courts if
90. Gelter & Siems, supra note 72, at 245.
91. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 101 (2008) (criticizing
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights' tendency to cite European and
international human rights case law).
92. Naz Foundation v. Delhi, [2009] AIR 160 (Delhi) 277.
93. Madhav Khosla, Inclusive Constitutional Comparison: Reelections on
India's Sodomy Decision, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 909, 927-28 (2011) ("By not making
distinctions between foreign jurisdictions, the Court may be sending a signal to the rest
of the world that Asia needs to be included in the conversation.").
94. Id. at 927 ("The Court could have been presenting India as a 'leader' within
Asia, where she is in competition with China both economically and diplomatically.").
95. Id. at 911. An alternative explanation is that the court referred to non-
Western precedents because it sustained the prohibition on sodomy. Thus, the court did
not have a Western precedent to refer to for supporting its decision.
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those courts have a good reputation. 96 In turn, cross citations
sometimes will make it possible to identify the good reputation
certain courts enjoy. In some cases, a court's reputation may be even
more important than the quality of the solution it offers.9 7 Thus, a
court may be cited due to its reputation and not because it offers
useful experience to the citing court. This may occur, as mentioned
above, when citing a particular court increases the legitimacy of the
decision. National parameters play an important part in determining
the status of courts as well. For example, in most cases a leading
court will be one from a large, old, or powerful country.9 8 Other
national parameters that affect the position of the court include
economic development, democratic standards, and constitutional
standards, as well as the prestige of the national legal system.99
Unfortunately, the lack of comprehensive research in this area
means that it is currently difficult to determine the domination and
coalition patterns among courts. Moreover, the existing state of
affairs does not yet make it possible to talk about a single leading
court or a specific group of leading courts. The system is currently
multipolar and will probably remain so at least in the near future.10 0
It is a dynamic system-courts that were considered leading in the
past, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, can lose their leading position
and others may gain leadership.1 1 In addition, there is no clear
hierarchy between courts. Nevertheless, since some patterns of
domination are already apparent, the second criterion of
structuration is fulfilled.
C. Increase in the Information Load with which Organizations in the
Field Must Contend
The criterion of information load addresses the amount of
information that comes before organizations in the organizational
field. There are two kinds of information: the relevant information
that the organizations are able to access, and the information that the
96. See John Bell, The Argumentative Status of Foreign Legal Arguments, 8
UTRECHT L. REV. 8, 17-18 (2012) (discussing the significance of a court system's
reputation). See generally Shai Dothan, Judicial Tactics in the European Court of
Human Rights, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 115 (2011) (discussing how reputation is linked to
compliance with judgments).
97. See Hol, supra note 73 at 1-2 (explaining that reputation is one of the
reasons why courts strive for coherence).
98. For an example of an analytical work on the subject, see Gelter & Siems,
supra note 72. The existence of stronger courts is mentioned in Hol, supra note 73, at 5.
99. Ferrarese, supra note 4, at 15.
100. See Slaughter, supra note 12, at 194; see also Christopher A. Whytock,
Transnational Judicial Governance, 2 ST. JOHN'S J. INT'L & COMP. L. 55, 64-66 (2012).
101. See id. at 64-66 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's declining influence
in judicial governance globally).
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organizations have to take into account when making their decisions.
The upsurge in information load increases the level of uncertainty
that organizations have to deal with because the additional
information can cause an information overload in the organizational
decision making.10 2 As a result, organizations are driven to look more
at each other's solutions in an attempt to figure out how the existing
information should be addressed.
The amount of relevant information that courts are exposed to
has grown significantly in recent decades.10 3 The increase in the
amount of information is, for the most part, the product of
globalization and of better and faster methods of communication. This
is, of course, a general phenomenon not limited to courts. Due to the
development of the Internet, more information is available to more
people and more organizations.10 4 As a result of improvements in
communication technology, more data than ever is accessible by
courts. For example, due to the development of new legal databases,
foreign decisions are more accessible. A report published in 2008
listed seventy-six databases, and the number has probably increased
since.10 5 Courts, at least theoretically, can use all of this information
as a basis for their decisions.
In addition, due to new global challenges there has been an
increase in the complexity of cases that come before courts and, as a
result, in the information courts need to take into account when
making their decisions. Nowadays, courts have to deal with new
problems that present complex conditions of uncertainty and global
effects. Many of these challenges are too extensive for one court to
deal with alone or have cross border effects. Possible solutions to
these challenges require at least some coordination between courts
and must take into account the ways various courts have dealt with
similar challenges.10 6 These challenges include, among others, "the
102. See e.g., Martin J. Eppler & Jeanne Mengis, The Concept of Information
Overload: A Review of Literature from Organization Science, Accounting, Marketing,
MIS, and Related Disciplines, 20 INFO. Soc'Y 325, 329-31 (2004) (explaining that
information improves the quality of decision making up to a point but that after a
certain amount, additional information decrease the quality of decisions).
103. Information is relevant to the courts if it provides data that can be used in
the case before them. The availability of this information does not mean that the courts
will take it into account or even look for it. See Michael R. Harris, Intervention of Right
in Judicial Proceedings to Review Informal Federal Rulemakings, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV.
879, 879 (discussing the information overload and duplicative legal arguments through
which court must sift to make judicial determinations).
104. See DAVID WEINBERGER, TOO BIG TO KNOW 10 (2011) (arguing that the
internet has led to an information overload and issues of filtering).
105. FUTURE CONFERENCE, supra note 52, at 74-77. Good examples of this kind
of database are LEXISNEXIS and WESTLAW. LEXISNEXIS, supra note 60; WESTLAW,
supra note 61.
106. See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 63, at 263.
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war on terror,"10 7 protection of human rights, 108 and refugees. 109
Another type of challenge that requires courts to look beyond their
borders is difficult problems that do not have one easy solution (e.g.,
the possible cultural clashes that happen in a multicultural
society). 110 In an attempt to find a suitable solution to those
problems, courts aim to learn from the experience of other courts and
countries that have dealt with similar problems.1 11 For example,
when deciding on the difficult issue of the constitutionality of private
prisons, the Supreme Court of Israel studied the experience of other
countries with privatization of prisons.1 1 2 In both types of cases,
transnational challenges and complicated problems, courts have
access to more information that they need to take into consideration
when making their decisions.
All in all, the amount of information available to courts is on the
rise. Courts can access a larger amount of relevant data due to the
development of technology. In addition, they have to deal with global
challenges and therefore must take a larger amount of data into
consideration. The increase in information load makes the tasks of
courts more difficult and induces them to look at each other's
decisions. It also encourages courts to communicate more with each
other in order to get the information they require and as a result
perceive each other as organizations in the same organizational field,
thus fulfilling the third criterion of field structuration.
D. Development of a Mutual Awareness among Participants in a Set of
Organizations that They are Involved in a Common Enterprise
According to this criterion, organizations in an organizational
field need to see themselves as involved in a common enterprise and
as sharing the same goal. When they do, they perceive the other
107. See generally Glenn M. Sulmasy, The Law of Armed Conflict in the Global
War on Terror: International Lawyers Fighting the Last War, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POLY 309 (2005).
108. See generally Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?:
Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 O.J.L.S. 499 (2000)
("It is now commonplace in many jurisdictions for judges to refer to the decisions of the
courts in foreign jurisdictions when interpreting domestic human rights guarantees.").
109. See generally H6lne Lambert, Transnational Law, Judges and Refugees in
the European Union, in THE LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill &
H6lne Lambert eds., 2010).
110. See, e.g., ENGAGING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: THE MULTICULTURAL
CHALLENGE IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 4 (Richard A. Shweder et al. eds., 2002).
111. See Sofio, supra note 6, at 136 (arguing that the use of foreign law is
justified when it helps judges better identify the consequences of their decisions).
112. See generally HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v.
Minister of Finance (Nov. 11, 2009) (Isr.).
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organizations in the organizational field as being similar to them and
as doing the same thing that they are doing.
It is hard to find clear-cut proof that courts believe that they are
involved in a common enterprise. Nevertheless, indications that there
is a common enterprise can be identified.113 Moreover, this is not the
first attempt to identify the existence of this enterprise. Anne Marie
Slaughter, for example, claims on the descriptive level that courts
have developed a common identity and have become a community of
courts. 114 According to Slaughter, the interactions between judges
make them "see each other not only as servants and representatives
of a particular polity, but also as fellow professionals in an endeavor
that transcends national borders.' '115 Moreover, "they are increasingly
coming to recognize each other as participants in a common judicial
enterprise."16 According to her findings, judges from different legal
systems share common values and beliefs as well as a perception of
their role in the legal system and in society,117 and they sometimes
relate more to judges in other jurisdictions than to their national
bodies and institutions.
118
If judges see themselves as involved in a common enterprise, it is
important to inquire into the goals of this enterprise. The current
literature suggests different answers to this question. One of them is
that the goal of this enterprise is to promote the strategic interests of
judges at the national or transnational level. One of these arguments
is made by Eyal Benvenisti. According to him, courts aim to join
forces to restrict executive latitude,119 which has increased ue to the
processes of globalization. These processes of globalization may result
in harm to national interests, especially due to pressures at the
international level. The courts are trying to coordinate the limits on
executive branches so that all of the executive branches will be in the
113. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Two
Fallacies of Interpretative Theory 1-2 (Chi. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No.
49, 14 2005). Unlike in the critique, the argument made here refers merely to one
specific court as an "it" and not to the judiciary in general. Moreover, unlike the
critique, the discussion here refers to the preferences, goals, and actions of the court
regarding itself as an organization (i.e., legitimacy) and not regarding its professional
work (i.e., legal interpretation).
114. See Slaughter, supra note 3, at 1108
115. SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 14, at 193.
116. Id.
117. See id. ("[Judges] face common substantive and institutional problems;
they learn from one another's experiences and reasoning; and they cooperate directly to
resolve specific disputes.").
118. See Claes & de Visser, supra note 9, at 100.
119. Benvenisti, supra note 63, at 243; see also Eyal Benvenisti & George W.
Downs, Court Cooperation, Executive Accountability, and Global Governance, 41 N.Y.U
J. INT'L L. & POL. 931, 932 (2009) (discussing judicial oversight's role in stemming the
power given to executive branches of certain nations regarding international
organization policy).
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same position, and their national interests will not be compromised.
The goal of the courts' enterprise may also be to strengthen their
position domestically as well as in the international legal
community. 120 For example, courts can strengthen their position by
ensuring judicial independence and professional integrity and as a
result protect an individual court's position at the national level or
increase its influence on the development of international law.
121
Acting as a group allows the courts to escape negative domestic
consequences that might occur if they acted unilaterally, by
increasing the legitimation of their actions.122 Another goal may be
the development of regional law in cases of regional integration, such
as the law of the European Union-a law whose application and
development requires judges to act as a group.
123
Another possibility is that courts have an ideological goal. For
example, the goal may be the promotion of human rights. In that
case, courts may see their common enterprise as being mediators
between international human rights norms and their domestic legal
systems.12 4 Or the goal may be the promotion of the rule of law, in
which case the task of courts is to make sure that the national
institutions follow the rule of law norms.125 The goal may also be the
promotion of coherence between legal systems (i.e., to ensure that like
cases will be treated alike at the transnational level).
126
Indications that support these scholarly claims regarding
common goals can be found in judicial behavior as well as in intention
statements of judicial organizations. First, as discussed above,
interaction among judges has increased during the last two decades.
The issue areas around which the interaction revolves may indicate
the different goals that are driving it. Second, different organizations
to which courts or judges belong have declared which goals they aim
to promote. 127 For example, the International Association of Judges
120. See Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 119, at 936-37.
121. Ferrarese, supra note 4, at 5.
122. Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 119, at 941
123. See Hol, supra note 73, at 6 ("In some cases there is a strong and direct
incentive to participate in a network, because applying European law requires
cooperation between the courts of different countries.").
124. See Melissa A. Waters, The Future of Transnational Judicial Dialogue, 104
PROCS. ANN. MEETING (AM. SOCv INT'L L.) 465, 466 (2010).
125. See generally TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAw (2010).
126. See Waldron, supra note 8. But see Bell, supra note 96, at 17-18
(suggesting that foreign lawyers are unlikely to adopt the legal rationale of foreign
legal systems in which domestic attorneys question legal merits).
127. Of course, different courts and different judges may vary in their
understanding of the best way of promoting a specific goal. They can also differ on their
definition of the goal. Nevertheless, a goal can be understood as a common goal if
courts agree on the general idea or a general value they promote. In this case, exactly
how this goal is defined and promoted will be designed in a dialogical process among
the participants in this enterprise. See Brian Ostrom & Roger Hanson, Achieving High
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states: "The main aim of the Association is to safeguard the
independence of the judiciary, which is an essential requirement of
the judicial function, guaranteeing human rights and freedom.' 128
The International Association of Women Judges, whose members hail
from a number of countries including the United States, defines itself
as sharing "a commitment to equal justice and the rule of law."129 The
Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the
European Union asserts that it "provides a forum through which
European institutions are given an opportunity to request the
opinions of Supreme Courts and to bring them closer by encouraging
discussion and the exchange of ideas. The members gather for
colloquiums to discuss matters of common interest.
1 30
As this Part describes, there are indications of the involvement
of courts in a common enterprise. Courts' awareness of their common
enterprise may have developed in a variety of ways, such as through
legal education, media coverage, judicial interaction, and more.13 1
Currently, scholars have identified signs of this involvement and
suggested different understandings of the common goal. Identifying
the exact goals of this enterprise lies outside the scope of this Article,
but future research focusing on this question will probably be able to
identify them more clearly.132
E. Structuration of the Transnational Organizational Field of Courts:
Conclusion
This Part of the Article has discussed the four criteria of
structuration with regard to the transnational organizational field of
courts and established that it is an emerging organizational field. For
the first criterion, it showed that there is a large amount of
interaction among the courts. For the second criterion, it showed that
patterns of domination and coalition are emerging. For the third
criterion, it explained that there has been an increase both in the
Performance: A Framework for Courts, HIGH PERFORMANCE COURT FRAMEWORK V
(April 2010), http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Files/PDF/Services%20and%20Experts/CTF/
AchievingHPCApril_2010.ashx [http://perma.cc/3WXN.DX3H] (archived Oct. 4,
2015).
128. Welcome to the International Association of Judges, INT'L ASS'N OF JUDGES,
http://www.iaj-uim.org [http://perma.cc/EB3W-43YW] (archived Oct. 3, 2015).
129. LAWJ Worldwide, THE INT'L ASS'N OF WOMEN JUDGES, http://www.iawj.org/
[http://perma.cc/CU7V-KRPF] (archived Oct. 3, 2015).
130. The Network, THE NETWORK OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURTS OF THE EUR. UNION, http://www.network-presidents.eulpage/
network-0 [http://perma.cc/LVF7-SYSZ] (archived Oct. 3, 2015).
131. See, e.g., Law, Judicial Comparativism, supra note 6, at 928.
132. The disagreements regarding the goal of the common enterprise can be
understood as a competition between different logics in the field. See SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 14, at 194 (asserting that if there is to be a unified
community of courts, "judges will have to take a further step and acknowledge, either
explicitly or implicitly, a set of common principles that define their mutual relations").
2016]
86 VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 49:59
amount of accessible relevant information that courts can look at and
in the information that courts need to take into account when making
their decisions. For the fourth criterion, it addressed indications of
the existence of a common enterprise that the courts are involved in
as well as its possible goals. This discussion suggests that there are
strong indications of the emergence of a transnational organizational
field of courts. Of course, this is not and never will be a monolithic
field. The position of courts, as well as their relationships with one
another, will always depend on factors such as legal systems,
prestige, and cultural ties. 133 Thus, having established that the
transnational organizational field of courts is emerging, the Article
now turns to discussing its possible effects on courts. The discussion
below focuses on the convergence between courts' characteristics that
is expected to negatively affect courts' national social legitimacy.
V. IMPLICATION FOR COURTS: INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM
Belonging to one transnational organizational field may have a
major influence on the courts.134 It may affect how courts understand
their roles and their behavior (hereinafter "courts' identity"),135 the
ways courts want to present themselves to their audiences
(hereinafter "courts' intended images" or "intended images"),136 and
133. See Wooten & Hoffman, supra note 17, at 134-35.
134. See id. at 130 (noting that belonging to an organizational field changes the
very concept of the organizational sell); cf. CAMPBELL, supra note 17, at 124-71
(analyzing the influence of globalization on taxation and arguing that it does not cause
rapid changes in taxation institutions).
135. The concept of court's identity used here is based on a concept of
organizational identity developed in the organizational theory literature.
Organizational identity is a type of collective identity. It is the shared meaning that
members, who are aware of belonging to the organization. See Stuart Albert & David
A. Whetten, Organizational Identity, 7 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 263 (1985); Kevin
G. Corley et al., Guiding Organizational Identity Through Aged Adolescence, 15 J.
MGMT. INQUIRY 85, 89-90 (2006) (explaining the controversy regarding whether
organizational identity is a metaphor or a phenomenon); Joep P. Cornelissen, S.
Alexander Haslam & John M. T. Balmer, Social Identity, Organizational Identity and
Corporate Identity: Towards an Integrated Understanding of Processes, Patternings and
Products, 18 BRITISH J. MGMT. 1, 3 (2007) (defining organizational as "relating to the
identity of the organization as a whole"); Dennis A. Gioia et al., Organizational Identity
Formation and Change, 7 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 123, 124-25 (2013) (reviewing the
literature on organizational identity). In other words, it is the answer that members of
the organization give to the question "who are we?" or "what do we stand for?" as an
organization. Anu Puusa, Conducting Research on Organizational Identity, 11
ELECTRONIC J. Bus. ETHICS & ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 24, 24 (2006).
136. The concept of court's intended image is based on a concept of intended
image developed in the organizational theory literature. Intended image, according to
Brown et al., consists of "[m] ental associations about the organization that organization
leaders want important audiences to hold." In other words, intended image answers
the question, "What does the organization wants others to think about it?" Tom J.
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the means that they use to do so.137 Such changes occur because
different processes at the organizational field level impact the courts
to make them more compatible with the transnational field they
operate in. 138 This Part discusses one such process-institutional
isomorphism, which causes organizations operating in the same
organizational field to converge in their practices and main
characteristics. Of course, caution needs to be exercised when
predicting these changes because not all courts will become similar to
each other, and the exact operation of this process depends on the
relationships between the courts in the field and the intensity of
those relationships, as well as on additional factors that are
extraneous to these relationships.
This Part now turns to explaining the process of institutional
isomorphism that, the Article argues, influences the courts. It
discusses both the theoretical aspect of the process and its existing
applications at the transnational level and then turns to discussing
how this process may be expected to affect courts. This influence, as
the Article argues, is likely to threaten courts' abilities to maintain
their national legitimacy.
Before turning to the discussion itself, a few preliminary
comments are due on the timeframe of this influence. The process of
institutional isomorphism is a likely result of the structuration of an
organizational field. Therefore, if the emergence of a transnational
organizational field of courts has been identified, an institutional
isomorphism between the courts may be expected. That does not
mean that courts are already converging, although, as will be
explained below, there is already some degree of convergence. The
argument made here suggests that convergence is a possible, and
even probable, path of globalization's influence on courts. Courts need
to take this path into account when making their decisions regarding
transnational engagement and be concerned about it when foreign
Brown et al., Identity, Intended Image, Construed Image and Reputation: An
Interdisciplinary Framework and Suggested Terminology, 34 J. ACAD. MARKETING SC.
99, 102 (2006). The intended image of an organization may or may not reflect the
actual identity of the organization. An organization can choose which attributes it
wants to communicate to its different audiences. It can create a tailor-made intended
image for different audiences. Each of those intended images will highlight specific
(relevant) positive characteristics of the organization. See Kristin Price & Dennis A.
Gioia, The Self-Monitoring Organization: Minimizing Discrepancies Among Differing
Images of Organizational Identity, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 208, 210 (2008).
137. For a discussion of the ways in which an organizational field may influence
identity, see Jesper Standgaard Pedersen & Frank Dobbin, In Search of Identity and
Legitimation: Bridging Organizational Culture and Neoinstitutionalism, 49 AM.
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 897 (2006); and Mary Ann Glynn, Beyond Constraint: How
Institutions Enable Identities, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL
INSTITUTIONALIsM 413, 413 (Royston Greenwood et al. eds., 2008).
138. See Wooten & Hoffman, supra note 17, at 141.
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practices and conceptions are adopted. If courts do so, they may avoid
the negative implications discussed in this Article.
A. Institutional Isomorphism: Theoretical Framework
Institutional isomorphism is a process through which
organizations operating in the same organizational field become
similar over time. 139 The process can influence all kinds of
organizations-for profit, nonprofit, and governmental
organizations.140 There are three classic mechanisms through which
institutional isomorphism occurs: coercive isomorphism, mimetic
isomorphism, and normative isomorphism. 141 Although they are
analytically distinct, in practice it is difficult to distinguish between
these mechanisms.142 Coercive isomorphism is the result of formal
and informal pressures exerted on organizations. These pressures
may be applied by other organizations or stem from cultural
expectations of the society in which organizations operate.143 Mimetic
isomorphism is the result of uncertainties that organizations in the
field have to deal with, such as ambiguous goals or a poorly
understood technology.144 In situations of uncertainty, organizations
model themselves after other organizations that they perceive as
legitimate or successful. Normative isomorphism is primarily the
result of professionalization in the organizational field, 145 with
139. For a detailed discussion of the theory and its implementations, see, e.g.,
SCOTT, supra note 23, at 152; Jens Beckert, Institutional Isomorphism Revisited:
Convergence and Divergence in Institutional Change, 28 Soc. THEORY 150, 150 (2010);
DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 24, at 151; Dingwerth & Pattberg, supra note 29, at
721-22; Young S. Kim et al., Structural Expansion and the Cost of Global
Isomorphism: A Cross-National Study of Ministerial Structure, 1950-1990, 17 INT'L
SOC. 481 (2002); and Mark S. Mizruchi & Lisa C. Fein, The Social Construction of
Organizational Knowledge: A Study of the Uses of Coercive, Mimetic, and Normative
Isomorphism, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 653, 656 (1999).
140. See generally Peter Frumkin & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Institutional
Isomorphism and Public Sector Organizations, 14 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 283
(2004) (empirically analyzing the difference between these three kinds of organizations
in relation to isomorphic pressures).
141. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 24, at 154-56 (discussing twelve
predictors of isomorphic change, organization-level predictors and field-level
predictors).
142. See Mizruchi & Fein, supra note 139, at 657 ("[T]hese three mechanisms
through which institutional isomorphism is diffused are not necessarily empirically
distinguishable.").
143. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 24, at 150-51.
144. Id. at 151-52
145. See id. at 152-54 ('The increased professionalization of workers whose
futures are inextricably bound up with the fortunes of the organizations that employ
them has rendered obsolescent (if not obsolete) the dichotomy between organizational
commitment and professional allegiance that characterized traditional professionals in
earlier organizations.").
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organizations tending to model themselves according to the views of
relevant professionals. Those views may be developed through similar
education (e.g., through similar legal education that judges
underwent when attending top law schools). In some cases,
institutional isomorphism might be symbolic, where organizations
adopt common attributes and create identification between
themselves and other organizations in order to increase their
legitimacy.1 46 For example, judges may adopt the practice of wearing
wigs and use it to indicate their connection to judicial traditions.
In a recent work, Jens Beckert suggested an updated view of the
process of institutional isomorphism, introducing a fourth
mechanism: competition. On the one hand, the mechanism of
competition may induce organizations to converge "because inefficient
institutional solutions are eliminated." 147 On the other hand,
organizations may develop diversities by finding niches to specialize
in.148 Beckert therefore argued that institutional isomorphism might
result not only in homogeneity, but also in heterogeneity among
organizations in the field. Thus, according to him, the four
mechanisms of institutional isomorphism can explain not only
institutional convergence but also institutional change in general.
149
Moreover, the new mechanism that he identified is compatible, for
example, with the findings that political parties operating in the
same political system tend to converge on policies over time.
150
Some questions regarding institutional isomorphism on the
transnational level are examined within globalization studies. The
neo-institutional approach to globalization is commonly referred to as
the world society theory.15 1 This approach refers to the world as an
environment in which nation-states, multinational corporations, and
international organizations are embedded.1 52 According to the world
society theory, globalization is the process through which a
consolidation of global fields occurs. 153 The theory discusses, among
146. See generally Mary Ann Glynn & Rikki Abzug, Institutionalizing Identity:
Symbolic Isomorphism and Organizational Names, 45 AcAD. MGMT. J. 267 (2002)
(discussing the impact of symbolic isomorphism on organizational identity and names).
147. Beckert, supra note 139, at 160,
148. See id.
149. Id. at 160-62.
150. See Alberto Alesina, Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party
System with Rational Voters, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 796, 796 (1988) (noting that in a two-
party system full convergence of policies will result from electoral competition).
151. See Gili S. Drori, Institutionalism and Globalization Studies, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 449, 449 (Royston Greenwood et al.
eds., 2008). See generally WORLD SOCIETY: THE WRITINGS OF JOHN W. MEYER (Georg
Kricken & Gill S. Drori eds., 2009) (explaining world society theory and its
implications).
152. See Drori, supra note 151, at 449.
153. See id. at 453-54 (stating that the contribution of the world society theory
is highlighting consolidation of the global system).
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other issues, the way actors at the world level become isomorphic.
1 4
Although this literature does not discuss the existence of
organizational fields, it obviously assumes that similar organizations
operating at the world level are part of the same organizational field.
A number of works belonging to the world society literature have
demonstrated the operation of institutional isomorphism at the
transnational level. 155 For example, Kim et al. showed that
governments around the world expanded and became structurally
similar due to the process of institutional isomorphism. 156 Mark
Thatcher and Alec Stone Sweet discussed how the process of
institutional isomorphism has contributed to the delegation of powers
to non-majoritarian institutions across Europe.157 Claudio Radaelli
examined institutional isomorphism within Europe that has resulted
in policy transfer among the Union's members. 158 Gulter et al.
analyzed transnational isomorphism among firms regarding the
adoption of ISO 9000 quality certification.159 LeTendre et al. found
that there is institutional isomorphism of teachers' beliefs and
practices in Germany, the United States, and Japan.160 Finally, Colin
Beck, Gili Drori, and John Meyer discussed the adoption of human
rights language in constitutions around the world, noting that a
country's position in the global order influences its inclination to
adopt human rights in its national constitution. 161
The concept of institutional isomorphism provides useful insights
for studying the transnational organizational field of courts. First, it
allows scholars to make educated guesses regarding how the
emergence of the field will affect courts. Based on research on other
organizational fields and isomorphic processes, at least some courts
will be expected to become similar over time.162 These courts may
154. See generally John W. Meyer & Ronald L. Jepperson, The 'Actors' of
Modern Society: The Cultural Construction of Social Agency, 18 Soc. THEORY 100
(2000) (evaluating modern actors in terms of their isomorphism).
155. Cf. RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES (2013)
(discussing the process of acculturation through which countries can learn to follow
human rights).
156. Kim, supra note 139.
157. Mark Thatcher & Alec Stone Sweet, Theory and Practice of Delegation to
Non-Majoritarian Institutions, 25 W. EUR. POL. 1, 12-13 (2002)
158. Claudio M. Radaelli, Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional
Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy, 13 GOVERNANCE 25 (2000).
159. Isin Gulter, Mauro F. Guill6n & John Muir Macpherson, Global
Competition, Institutions, and the Diffusion of Organizational Practices: The
International Spread of ISO 9000 Quality Certificates, 47 ADM. SCI. Q. 207 (2002).
160. Gerald K. LeTendre et al., Teachers' Work: Institutional Isomorphism and
Cultural Variation in the U.S., Germany, and Japan, 30 EDUC. RESEARCHER 3 (2001).
161. Colin J. Beck, Gili S. Drori & John W. Meyer, World Influences on Human
Rights Language in Constitutions: A Cross-National Study, 27 INTL SOC. 483 (2012).
162. Taking into account the three mechanisms developed by DiMaggio and
Powell as well as Beckert's fourth mechanism will provide information regarding which
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converge on the doctrines they use, the way they write their
decisions, the norms they adopt, or the relationships they have with
their national and international audiences. An example of this kind of
convergence is the process through which the doctrine of
proportionality has spread around the world. 163 Other examples
include cross border convergence of decisions in hard cases, such as in
the "wrongful life" cases,164 and the use of concurring and dissenting
opinions by courts. 165 Second, using the concept of institutional
isomorphism enables scholars to apply the quantitative
methodologies used by scholars of organizational fields to the
transnational relationships of courts. For example, a scholar can use
statistical analysis to compare the amount of citations different
courts use. These methods will be able to expose whether different
courts and legal systems affect their tendency to cite foreign law.
Third, the mechanism of institutional isomorphism may be used to
explain changes in courts. For example, scholars may be able to
explain changes in courts' behavior that do not practically affect their
activities-for example, in judicial seating arrangements or the
design of courtrooms-as a result of symbolic isomorphism. In
addition, understanding the operation of institutional isomorphism
may allow scholars to identify the "role model" court that other courts
follow.
In the context of this Article, institutional isomorphism predicts
convergence of courts in the way they understand their roles and the
way they interact with their national audiences. The institutional
structure of courts can also be influenced by institutional
courts are likely to become more similar over time, and which are likely to become
more different over time.
163. See JACKSON, supra note 78, at 60-64 (arguing that the convergence on the
use of proportionality may lead to both convergence and divergence of substantive law);
Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 72, 161-63 (2008) (discussing how
different legal systems use proportionality analysis).
164. See Ivo Giesen, The Use and Influence of Comparative Law in 'Wrongful
Life' Cases, 8 UTRECHT L. REV. 35 (2012) (analyzing the use of comparative law in the
decisions of 'wrongful life' cases and arguing that in addition to local norms,
comparative law had some influence on the decisions); Frans van Waarden & Michaela
Drahos, Courts and (Epistemic) Communities in Convergence of Competition Policies, 9
J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 913 (2002) (providing another example of convergence-competition
policy, which has moved toward convergence in Europe due to courts' actions among
other things).
165. See, e.g., Michael D. Kirby, Judicial Dissent: Common Law and Civil Law
Traditions, 123 LAW Q. REV. 379 (2007) (discussing dissenting opinions in common law
and civil law traditions and mentioning the current debates regarding the adoption of
the practice of dissenting opinions in civil law courts); Elaine Mak, Why do Dutch and
UK Judges Cite Foreign Law?, 70 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 420, 430 (2011) (showing that
justices serving on the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom began writing concurring
and dissenting opinions in 2009).
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isomorphism.1 6 6 In most cases, however, institutional change will not
be a direct result of judicial actions, but the doing of reformers,
politicians, and scholars. This type of influence therefore falls outside
the scope of this Article. The next section explains how the
mechanisms of institutional isomorphism operate in the case of courts
and cause them to converge on their different characteristics.
B. Transnational Institutional Isomorphism of Courts
Previous Parts of the Article argued that supreme courts,
constitutional courts, and other courts are becoming part of the same
organizational field, and that therefore there is a high probability
that these courts will undergo the process of institutional
isomorphism.167 This section focuses on institutional isomorphism of
courts' identities and courts' intended images, as well as on the ways
courts communicate their intended images. 168 It will address the
different mechanisms of institutional isomorphism and the ways they
are likely to influence courts in this respect. The normative
consequences and concerns of this institutional isomorphism will be
discussed in the next section.
A few preliminary words of caution are necessary before turning
to the analysis itself. There is currently no empirical way to measure
the future developments of convergence and divergence of courts'
identities and courts' intended images. For the time being, it is only
possible to predict the plausible developments in this area and
attempt to identify some of the early effects of institutional
166. See, e.g., Toby S. Goldbach, Benjamin Brake & Peter J. Katzenstein, The
Movement of U.S. Criminal and Administrative Law: Processes of Transplanting and
Translating, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 141 (2013) (providing examples of
institutional isomorphism of criminal and administrative law systems around the
world).
167. Cf. Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49
VA. J. INT'L L. 985 (2009) (arguing that national courts are expected to converge in
their structures and their protection of human rights due to top-down and bottom-up
pressures).
168. Courts can communicate their intended images to their audiences in a
variety of ways. A full discussion of those methods, as well as their importance, will be
developed elsewhere. For the purpose of this Article, it is enough to sketch the variety
of these methods. The methods courts use for communicating messages to their
audiences can be divided into three main categories. The first is messages that courts
communicate when fulfilling their official roles, for example, official decisions. The
second category includes actions of individual judges that reflect on the court, for
example, talks that judges give or non-judicial roles that judges perform. The third
category, and the most important in my eyes, includes organizational actions that are
beyond the official role of courts. These actions are important because they have the
power to communicate a more nuanced and even subconscious message that may
influence audiences' attitudes toward the court. These methods include movies and
books about the court, courts' buildings, courts' museums, courts' websites, and courts'
visual representations uch as logos.
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isomorphism. Hence, this Article will not provide any proof of
institutional isomorphism of courts, but rather will provide a
prognosis of courts' future developments. In general, as mentioned
above, institutional isomorphism will not affect all courts in the same
way.169 First, convergence is likely to occur between groups of courts,
especially courts belonging to the same legal system or in legal
systems using the same language.170 Second, some courts will be
more resistant to convergence pressures than others. For example,
courts that enjoy high prestige at the national and transnational evel
or those with a long and venerable tradition will probably be less
affected by institutional isomorphism than new courts of low status.
This section now turns to discussing the mechanisms of
institutional isomorphism. Three of them are the "classical"
mechanisms: coercive isomorphism, normative isomorphism, and
mimetic isomorphism. The fourth mechanism is the mechanism
proposed by Beckert-competition.171 These mechanisms are expected
to affect different characteristics of courts: structure, norms,
practices, self-understanding, and courts' relationships with their
different audiences. Thus, they are expected to change courts'
organizational identities and intended images.
Coercive isomorphism. In theory, there are no other
organizations that can coerce supreme courts and constitutional
courts into certain behaviors or identity structures. Nevertheless, in
practice, there are some institutions-mainly regional and
international courts-that may exert a coercive influence on courts.
Of course, not all of these supranational courts have the same
influence on national courts. However, some courts, such as the
European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the
Inter-American Court, and the International Court of Justice, may
profoundly affect national courts. These supranational courts may
make decisions concerning the powers or procedures of national
courts-for example, that national courts must take international law
into consideration and that not doing so is a breach of the country's
obligations under international law. National courts may
consequently adapt their institutional practices and begin looking at
169. Cf. Gulter, Guill6n & Macpherson, supra note 159 (using network analysis
to study how institutional isomorphism affects different firms and showing that role-
equivalent firms are likely to imitate each other).
170. See, e.g., Bobek, supra note 4 (discussing how courts engage in comparative
arguments especially as part of the same legal system); Gelter & Siems, supra note 11
(arguing that language is an important factor for cross citations between two different
legal systems); Martin Gelter & Mathias Siems, Networks, Dialogue or One-Way
Traffic? An Empirical Analysis of Cross-Citations Between Ten of Europe's Highest
Courts, 8 UTRECHT L. REV. 88, 93 (2012) (noting that the most important factor for
cross-citation was language skills).
171. Beckert, supra note 139, at 160.
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international law, and addressing international law may even become
an integral part of courts' organizational identities. 172 Through
coercive practices, supranational courts can also influence the way
courts communicate with their audiences. For example, they may
decide that not publishing all of a court's decisions online or not
translating all decisions into all of the national official languages is a
violation of the country's international obligations. Such decisions
may make national courts change how they communicate with
national audiences, thereby influencing how the courts communicate
their intended images to these audiences.
An additional practice that may result in coercive isomorphism
rests on the variety of international ranking systems. These
measurements classify and give different scores to legal systems and
courts based on parameters they consider important. The ranking
may convey to courts that the parameters on which the ranking is
based are very important for a "good" court. Consequently, courts
may integrate the parameters of the ranking into their identities or
focus on them when communicating with their audiences (change
their intended images). For example, the World Justice Project ranks
countries based on their rule of law scores.173 The scores are compiled
based on a variety of parameters; some of these parameters are court
related. Due to the grave importance of this ranking (e.g., its
influence on the World Bank's attitude toward a country), courts need
to take it into account when making their decisions if they want to
promote their country on the international level. Therefore, courts
may highlight these parameters in reports they publish. The pressure
is especially strong when the World Bank organizes programs to
teach courts how to follow these criteria.
174
Normative isomorphism. Normative isomorphism develops as a
result of professionalization pressures. Regarding courts, there are
three main ways in which this type of influence operates. First,
justices across the world may acquire a similar education-for
example, from elite law schools in the United States or Europe.
During their studies, justices may internalize a specific court identity
as normatively superior and therefore be inclined to ascribe this
organizational identity to the court they serve on, or at least
communicate this identity to their audiences (promote a specific
intended image). Second, the close relationships between courts make
172. Of course, as with other pressures, courts may attempt to oppose and defy
the coercive pressure. In this case, they are likely to adopt the opposite identity
characteristic-an organizational identity focused on a national view.
173. THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org (last visited
Oct. 11, 2015) [http://perma.cc/C6LT-Y9ET] (archived Oct. 4, 2015).
174. See Toby S. Goldbach, Reimaginging Judges and Legal Change (May 2014)
(unpublished dissertation) (on file with the author) (showing that the World Bank
spent US$850 million since 1994 in thirty-six projects aimed at achieving this goal).
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justices see each other as peers and as a professional group. As a
result, certain beliefs regarding courts' identities or intended images
may become common among justices-the desirable and obvious ways
for courts to understand their identities and to communicate their
intended images. Third, transnational egal networks may play a role
in normative isomorphism. For example, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) or transnational law firms that bring similar
cases before different courts may convey the idea that normatively
there is a specific way courts should understand their role when
approaching these similar cases.
1 75
Mimetic isomorphism. Courts operate in situations of
uncertainty both regarding specific issues, for example technological
developments, as well as regarding possible reactions to their
decisions at the national and international level. Of course, some
courts are more vulnerable than others to these kinds of
uncertainties. For example, courts that enjoy less legitimacy at the
national level may suffer more negative consequences from unpopular
decisions than courts that enjoy higher national legitimacy, 176
because courts that enjoy higher diffuse support are less influenced
by lack of specific support for a particular decision.177 It is therefore
175. See Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Advocacy
Networks in International and Regional Politics, 51 INT'L SOC. SCI. J. 89 (1999)
(discussing transnational advocacy networks and their importance).
176. Shai Dothan, How International Courts Enhance Their Legitimacy, 14
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 455, 477 (2013)
177. The literature divides courts' legitimacy into two types: specific support
and diffuse support. See James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Vanessa A. Baird, On
the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 343, 344 (1998)
(analyzing legitimacy using both types: specific support and diffuse support). Specific
support is the direct awareness of, and agreement with, courts' decisions. See Dean
Jaros & Robert Poper, The U.S. Supreme Court: Myth, Diffuse Support, Specific
Support, and Legitimacy, 8 AM. POL. RES. 85, 90-91 (1980). Diffuse support is
institutional loyalty and the willingness to accept or tolerate decisions that the public
(or a particular group within the public) does not agree with. See James L. Gibson,
Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Why Do People Accept Public Policies
They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL.
RES. Q. 187, 188-89 (2005) ('The most useful way to conceptualize diffuse support, we
argue, is to think of it as institutional loyalty-support not contingent upon
satisfaction with the immediate outputs of the institution."). Although the two kinds of
support do not have a clear and direct correlation, studies show that in general specific
support leads to diffuse support. See Gibson, Caldeira & Baird, supra (showing
empirically that direct support leads to diffuse support. In addition, the authors show
that familiarity with the court leads to diffuse support). According to studies, the level
of specific support is not stable over time and may change as a result of courts' actions
or external political factors. See generally Gregory L. Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor
the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1209 (1986) (examining the patterns of public support of the U.S. Supreme Court
between the years 1966 and 1984); Gregory L. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The
Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 635, 636 (1992)
(examining diffuse and specific support for the Supreme Court of the United States);
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reasonable to expect at least some courts to look at the behavior of
other courts in cases of uncertainty. The less legitimate courts will
look to courts that they consider to be legitimate and successful and
attempt to learn from them. Some will choose to adopt or mimic
behaviors and characteristics they perceive to be successful because
they believe they know the (positive) consequences of such
behavior. 178 Courts may adopt parts of "successful" identities,
attempt to communicate intended images that are similar to
"successful" intended images that other courts communicate, or use
communication methods that are employed by other courts. For
example, judges from Ghana learn "the best practices" for
administering their courts from Canadian judges as part of a
cooperation project between the two judiciaries. 179
Competition. The transnational competition between courts,
unlike competition among other organizations, is limited because
each operates in its own country and has its own jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, there are circumstances when competition between
courts may occur. 180 First, courts may compete for the leading
position in the organizational field so that they can influence other
courts. In some cases, the competition may induce them to develop
specialization in certain specific areas of law, such as social rights, in
order to be considered leading courts at least in those, if not all,
areas. If courts choose to do so, they are then likely to develop an
organizational identity and intended image that revolve around their
specialization. Second, courts may compete for attention from NGOs
or other organizations. A court may want to be the first to decide on a
controversial issue in order to improve its transnational position or
influence the development of law around the world, and may
therefore craft its identity and especially its intended image in a way
Robert H. Durr, Andrew D. Martin & Christina Wolbrecht, Ideological Divergence and
Public Support for the Supreme Court, 44 AM. J. POL. Sci. 768 (2000) (suggesting that
the divergence between public opinion and the Supreme Court's decisions affect the
level of support for the court; the authors examine this measure of support for the
years 1973 through 1993). James L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court
in a Polarized Polity, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507 (2007) (examining the
legitimacy level of the U.S. Supreme Court between the years 1987 and 2005 and
concluding that the support of the court did not decline). Moreover, research shows that
diffuse support can vary among audiences. See, e.g., James L. Gibson & Gregory A.
Caldeira, Defenders of Democracy? Legitimacy, Popular Acceptance, and the South
African Constitutional Court, 65 J. POL. 1 (2003) (analyzing the differences in the
legitimacy level of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in the eyes of different
racial groups in South Africa).
178. Like other processes of isomorphism, this process will not affect all courts
in a similar way. 'Veaker" or 'less successful" courts will tend to mimic other courts
much more than "strong" or "successful" courts will.
179. Goldbach, supra note 174.
180. Cf. David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights,
102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1277 (2008) (arguing that competitive pressures influence the
development of national constitutional rights).
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that makes it attractive to interest groups. Given that the court
cannot initiate the litigation, it can use this tactic to increase the
likelihood that a litigant will turn to it. For example, courts may
publicly highlight that they offer a flexible right of standing. Courts
can also hint in their decisions that they will be sympathetic to
certain arguments if they will come before them.
All in all, as discussed above, courts' identities, intended images
of courts, and the ways courts communicate these intended images
will probably be vulnerable to isomorphic pressures. As a result of
globalization and the emergence of an organizational field of courts,
courts' identities, intended images of courts, and the methods courts
use to communicate their intended images may be expected to
change. Although there will probably be some divergence,
convergence is more likely to be the dominant trend because the
pressures at this direction will be greater. It will be stronger, of
course, among courts belonging to specific groups, and it will not
influence all courts in the same way. As will be explained next, this
tendency should worry courts.
VI. A REASON TO WORRY: NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL
ISOMORPHISM FOR COURTS
To date, scholars discussing the phenomenon of transnational
judicial dialogue have raised a number of normative concerns.181
These discussions have focused mostly on judicial discretion to
change national law as a result of foreign influence, contrary to the
will of the people. This Article focuses on a different concern, one that
should worry the courts most of all: losing national support as a
result of changes in courts' identities, intended images, and the ways
courts to communicate intended images. In other words, it focuses not
on the ways courts understand and apply the law, but on the ways
courts understand their own roles in the national system. This
concern is unlike other concerns raised in the literature in that it
does not refer to the ability of judges to do "whatever they want," but
to the likelihood that judges will lose power and the ability to do
"what they are expected to do" (i.e., have their decisions enforced).'8 2
181. See discussion, supra Part II, regarding judicial dialogue.
182. The question whether courts should follow the people's preferences,
especially in cases of expected outrage, is contested. See Cass R. Sunstein, If People
Would be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 212
(2007) (arguing that in most cases judges should not care about possible outrage over
their controversial decisions and should not change their decisions accordingly). The
argument made here is different for two main reasons. First, while Sunstein discusses
the substance of courts' decisions, the argument here focuses on courts' organizational
identity and self-presentation. Normatively, it is less problematic if courts adapt these
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First, the assumption in this paper is that the separation of
powers at the national level is important.83 In addition, it is taken
for granted that it is important to have checks and balances between
the different branches of government in order to maintain good
governance.184 Under these assumptions, this Part argues that the
changes in courts' identities and in intended images of the judicial
branch-especially of various supreme courts-may disturb this
balance. Specifically, the argument is that changes in courts'
identities and intended images resulting from transnational judicial
interaction may result in courts falling out of sync with the other
national branches, disrupting the existing balance between them;
courts may check the other branches too much or too little (depending
on the transnational influence in practice) and thereby lose the
support of their audiences. Losing support may, in turn, affect courts'
ability to perform their social roles.
In addition, these changes in courts' identities and intended
images may result in courts falling out of sync with the general public
or with some of their other audiences. This is especially true
regarding the way the audiences and the courts understand the
courts' social role. In other words, courts may understand their social
role differently than how the other branches, the public, and even the
constitution expect them to. Thus, if courts act according to their own
understanding of their roles, they will be defying the expectations of
other national groups. These groups are likely to object to those
actions and critique the courts as a result. This critique, in turn, may
result in loss of support for the courts' actions and even for the courts
themselves as a social and legal institution. For example, judges may
adopt foreign practices that allow judges to voice their minds about
political questions that have not come before the court. In this
situation, the public may see the court as biased or merely political,
lacking objectivity, and thus lose trust in it.
Theoretically, one could argue that globalization may have a
similar influence on audiences and on courts regarding their
perception of suitable solutions to social and political problems and
regarding the courts' social roles (i.e., that there is no danger to
courts' legitimacy). While this may be true regarding solutions to
characteristics to meet audiences' expectations. Second, the discussion here is
conducted from the court's point of view. In some cases, the court, when making a
decision that will cause outrage, is risking its legitimacy. Nevertheless, making this
decision may still be normatively preferable. Thus, similarly, in some cases a court may
converge with other foreign courts and lose national legitimacy, even though the
convergence will be normatively desirable to the court or to its society.
183. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 47; CHARLES DE
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 24 (A. Donaldson ed., 4th ed.).
184. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 51; Benvenisti, supra note
63 (discussing how delegation of authority to international organizations could
undermine the checks and balances system).
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legal questions, it will not be the case regarding perception of the
courts' role in the national legal and political order. That is because
courts will be much more subject than their audiences to
transnational influences regarding their own roles and actions. The
reason for the difference is the amount of time and effort that courts
devote to reflecting on their role in comparison to the time their
audiences devote to this task. This Article will elaborate on this point
at the end of this Part.
As discussed above, the transnational influence on courts is
likely to result in institutional isomorphism of courts' identities and
courts' intended images. Therefore, it will result in changes in courts'
identities and their intended images, toward either convergence or
divergence.'8 5 For the purpose of the argument made here, the
direction of the change is unimportant, because any change may
disturb the balance of courts' relationships with their national
audiences, including their relationships with other branches.
Although the process of institutional isomorphism of courts is
only beginning, illustrations of this possible influence are already
identifiable. For example, Justice Breyer, when visiting Panama, said
that he wants to learn from the Supreme Court of Panama how it
manages its relationship with the press.18 6 There is no good reason to
doubt the sincerity of Justice Breyer's intention when making the
statement. The U.S. Supreme Court, then, may adopt practices used
by the Supreme Court of Panama. If adopted, these practices may not
conform to the social expectations of the internal audience in the
United States, causing a disruption in the Court's relationship with
this audience.
These transnational influences may cause courts to act in ways
that will be highly criticized by at least some of their national
audiences because they will not fit the expectations of those
audiences. Courts, learning from the positive experience of other
courts in the transnational organizational field, are likely to design
their intended images to be similar to the intended images of foreign
"successful" courts. These intended images may not fit the national
political and social circumstances within the country and the national
expectations of the court. The result may be a decrease in the court's
legitimacy and may have grave consequences for the court, especially
185. Cf. Gili S. Drori et al., Branding the University: Relational Strategy of
Identity in a Competitive Field, in TRUST IN UNIVERSITIES 137 (Lars Engqall & Peter
Scott eds., 2013) (discussing the way globalization influences the branding of
universities and some of the normative concerns it raises).
186. See Hon. Stephen Breyer, Communication Media and Its Relationship twith.
Supreme Courts, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1083, 1083 (1998).
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regarding the public support it enjoys and the likelihood that its
decisions, especially controversial ones, will be enforced.187
Of course, a court and its audiences may not see eye-to-eye
regarding the court's role, even before the transnational influence.
Thus, this Article does not claim that transnational influence is the
only possible cause of the disruption in the relationships between
courts and their audiences, but that it is an additional factor that
may aggravate the disruption between the court and at least some of
its audiences. Two examples, one from the U.S. Supreme Court and
the other from the Supreme Court of Israel, will illustrate how
transnational influence may cause this type of disruption.
For the U.S. Supreme Court, the citing of foreign decisions in its
own opinions constitutes the adoption of a transnational practice.
Currently, only some justices serving on the court cross cite foreign
decisions, and this practice is still much debated among them.
1 88
Nevertheless, there is already a heated debate regarding this practice
outside the Court, both among the other branches and in the general
public.189 It is evident, even without going into the merits of the
arguments made by both sides that this practice draws widespread
critique and has implications for the Court. The opponents of citation
of foreign law believe that the use of foreign law in decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court is illegitimate and therefore any decision that is
based, or appears to be based, on foreign sources would probably be
considered illegitimate in their eyes. Thus, if the Court understands
its role to include learning from foreign practices and basing many of
its decisions on foreign law, it is likely to lose a great deal of its
national support. This concern will intensify if justices on the Court
give speeches supporting the practice and draw even more attention
to the practice that may draw more extensive and vocal critique of the
Court. As a result of this transnational engagement and influence,
187. The level of courts' social legitimacy is important because courts have no
sword, and they must depend on others to enforce and follow their judgments. See
HAMILTON, supra note 2, (explaining that the Executive holds the sword and the
judiciary has no influence over the sword or the purse); Bassok, The Sociological-
Legitimacy Difficulty, 26 J.L. & POL. 239, 240-41 (2011) ("[B]ecause the Court lacks
direct control over either the 'sword or the purse,' sociological legitimacy is instead
necessary for the Court's proper function."); Reichman, supra note 1, at 1621 (stating
that the Supreme Court must maintain public confidence in its performance of law).
Therefore, if a court enjoys a high level of legitimacy then political majorities will
enforce its decisions, even if they contradict the majority's preferences. See Gibson,
Caldeira & Baird, supra note 177, at 343; Mattew C. Stephenson, Court of Public
Opinion: Government Accountability and Judicial Independence, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
379 (2004) (arguing that the public will support the courts and therefore will ensure
that their decisions be enforced, if it believes that the courts are likely to act in its
interest when performing judicial review).
188. See, e.g., Dorsen, supra note 6.
189. See discussion, supra Part II, regarding the debate on cross-citing foreign
decisions.
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the Court's legitimacy may be expected to decrease, and there may
even be a backlash from the Court's audiences.1 90
The Supreme Court of Israel provides another example of these
possible implications for courts' legitimacy. In 1995, in the famous
Mizrahi Bank case, the Supreme Court established its power of
judicial review of legislation. 19 1 The decision in the case explained the
reasons why the Supreme Court of Israel has the power to perform
judicial review of legislation. This argument was based mainly on
foreign sources, especially on American judicial theory and the
canonic Marbury v. Madison case,192 a decision that to this day is
understood as the basis of judicial review in the United States. Of
course, for the argument made here, the importance of these citations
lies not in their existence, but in being indicators of the foreign
influence that caused the change in the court's organizational
identity. Thus, the result of the Mizrahi Bank decision was a change
in the court's identity-from a court that does not perform judicial
review of legislation to one that does. The court's new identity, at
least in this respect, is similar to the identities of other leading
foreign courts, especially that of the U.S. Supreme Court. This change
in the court's identity received mixed reactions from the other
governmental branches in Israel as well as from the court's different
national audiences. In general, the criticism of the court by members
of the Knesset, the Israeli legislative branch, focused and still focuses
on the court's deviation from its original role (original identity).9 3 In
addition, the court's legitimacy in the eyes of the public, especially in
the eyes of certain groups, was greatly reduced,'94 and the public's
trust in the court dropped in 2008 to below 50 percent.
95
190. Cf. David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash?
Evidence from a National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 768--71 (2012)
(suggesting that in order to avoid backlashes, people, and the court itself, should talk
differently about the court-the argument made here focuses on the way courts talk to
their audiences and suggests that in some cases convergence in these methods may
increase or even create a backlash). , I
191. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village 49(4) PD
221 [1995] (Isr.).
192. See id. at 247-49 (mentioning additional decisions from the United States,
Australia, the United Kingdom, International Courts, Germany, South Africa, India,
and Canada).
193. See, e.g., Moran Azolai, "Hukai Beit Ha'mishpat" Ushro: Netanyahu
ve'Barak Barhu ["Laws of the Court" Were Approved: Netanyahu and Barak Rart
Away], YNET (Isr.) (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.ynet.co.ilarticles/O,7340,L-
4148173,00.html [http://perma.cc/BR4N-UFKD] (archived Oct. 4, 2015).
194. See, e.g., Yael Hadar, Amon Ha'zibur Haisraeli bemosadot ha'shilton
baasor ha'ahron [The Trust of the Israeli Public in Governmental Institutions in the
Last Decade], 66 PARLIAMENT (2009) (Isr.), http://www.idi.org.ilo. -m,55/ /,
6- [http://perma.ec/A2RW-X7KX] (archived
Oct. 4, 2015).
195. Compare ARIE RATNER, TARBUT HA'HOK, THE CULTURE OF LAW (2009)
(serving the trust of the Israeli public and different social groups in the courts and the
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These two examples show that there are cases where the gaps
between a court's identity, intended images (including the ways
courts communicate these images), and audiences' expectations are
products of transnational influence. These gaps can add to possible,
some already existing, tensions between courts and their national
audiences and endanger courts' national legitimacy and their status
even more. It is therefore important that courts keep these dangers in
mind when taking part in the transnational judicial dialogue. If
courts' identities, intended images, and means of communicating
those images change, via institutional isomorphism or other
processes, they may fall out of sync with the national audiences'
expectations of courts. The result may be a decrease in courts'
legitimacy and even attempts by other branches to change the courts'
role through legislation.1 96 Of course, this does not mean that courts
should not engage in transnational interactions. It means that they
should do so carefully, keeping in mind the possible dangers of the
process.
Before turning to the Conclusion, two additional clarifications
are needed. First, one could argue that the danger that such a gap
will emerge is not great because other branches and courts' audiences
encounter transnational influences as well, so audiences expectations
from courts may change to fit courts' practices. For example, Erik
Voeten found that citizens in European countries are as interested in
international and regional courts as they are in their national
courts.1 9 7 It could therefore be argued that these audiences may be
expected to change their perception of their national courts in a way
that is compatible with the courts' new identities and intended
images. On the face of things, if courts and their audiences are
subject to similar influences, then the audiences' expectations may
well fit the reformed identities and intended images of courts, and
there is no danger to the courts' legitimacy and no need for normative
concerns. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
law enforcement agencies), with Adam Shinar, Accidental Constitutionalism: The
Political Foundation and Implication of Constitution-Making in Israel, in THE SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONS 207, 227-29 (2013) (arguing that the
decrease in the level of the court's legitimacy brought it to a normal level that is
similar to the level of courts' legitimacy in other countries and claiming that the new,
lower level of public trust is desirable because it shows that the public critically
examines the court's actions).
196. See, e.g., Draft Bill Basic Law: Constitutional Court, 2007, HH No.
2261/17/P (Isr.); Draft Bill Constitutional Court, 2002, HH No. 3380/P (Isr.); Draft Bill
Constitutional Court, 2006, HH 468/17P (Isr.); Draft Bill Constitutional Court, 2009,
HH No. 607/18/P (Isr.); Draft Bill The Judiciary (Amendment-Authority to Nullify a
Law), 2006, HH No. 401/17/P (Isr.).
197. Erik Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 14
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 411, 413 (2013) (finding that citizens from the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany seek information in similar amounts about the
European courts as they do about their national high courts).
SHOULD COURTS FEAR TRANSNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT?
Even if the influence on the court and on its audiences is of the
same kind (i.e., pressuring both the courts and the audiences to
accept the same identities of courts), which is not likely, it will not be
of the same magnitude. While courts and their audiences may devote
a similar amount of attention to transnational influence in specific
issues (e.g., wrong life cases or war on terrorism cases) because they
are equally of interest to them, this is not true regarding courts'
identities and intended images. Courts focus on their judicial roles
much more than other audiences. In fulfilling their roles, courts look
at other foreign courts when deciding how they should behave or
decide, especially in situations of uncertainty. Courts' audiences are
busy with their own social roles and have fewer resources to use when
looking at the national court and other courts in the transnational
arena and wonder about their respective roles. The isomorphic
pressures will therefore be stronger on courts than on their
audiences. To be clear, even if courts and audiences may see eye-to-
eye on certain new legal doctrines, that is different from courts and
their audiences seeing eye-to-eye on the courts' roles. Thus, even if
the pressure drives both the courts and their audiences into accepting
similar changes in courts' identities and courts' intended images,
these courts' identities and intended images will converge much
faster than the audiences' perceptions of the courts. As a result, a gap
between audiences' expectations of courts and courts' identities and
intended images is likely to emerge, even if courts' audiences do
follow foreign courts.
Second, each court has a variety of different national
audiences.198 These audiences may have different expectations of the
court and may see the court's role differently. Moreover, the global
influence on these audiences may differ. Thus, the process of
institutional isomorphism of courts may be expected to affect the
relationships of these audiences with the court differently. In some
cases the changes in the court will create greater distance between it
and a specific audience and may decrease the court's legitimacy in the
eyes of that audience. In other cases, the changes will fit well with
the audience's expectations and may even increase the legitimacy of
the court in the eyes of that audience. The exact direction of the
influence will be determined by the court's initial legitimacy in the
eyes of that audience, the audience's expectation of the court, and the
isomorphic changes in the court. As a result, institutional
isomorphism may have benefits for the court in terms of its
legitimacy. The goal of this Article was not to dismiss or
underestimate these possible benefits, but to identify, highlight, and
198. See, e.g., BAUM, supra note 1 (noting the different national audiences such
as the general public, other government branches, social groups, professional groups,
policy groups, and the news media).
20161
104 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 49:59
raise awareness of the possible dangers of globalization's influences
on courts. It has therefore argued that courts should be aware of
these possible dangers and should take them into account, to the
extent possible, when adopting foreign practices. Of course, at the
same time, courts need to consider the possible benefits of
institutional isomorphism and the varied ways in which globalization
will influence their relationships with their different audiences. They
should also take into account their existing relationships with their
different audiences regarding both practical considerations (e.g., the
importance of the audience for the ability of the court to function) and
normative considerations (e.g., the role of the court in protecting that
audience).
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has highlighted that transnational interactions of
courts have implications that ought to worry courts. To establish this
claim, it first addressed the main manifestation of the globalization of
courts-transnational judicial dialogue-arguing that this
globalization process should be understood as the emergence of a
transnational organizational field of courts. It also supported this
claim with evidence from the existing transnational engagement of
courts. Next, the Article turned to discussing the influence of
globalization on courts and focused on the process of institutional
isomorphism. Through this process, courts operating in the same
organizational field will become similar over time. The Article argued
that as a result of this process, courts' identities, intended images of
courts, and the ways courts communicate their intended images will
become similar across national borders. The process may result in the
widening of existing gaps and emergence of new ones between courts
and their audiences. These gaps, the Article explained, raise
normative concerns, especially regarding the courts' ability to
properly react to and interact with their national audiences in the
future and their ability to maintain their national legitimacy.
Thus, the concerns regarding transnational judicial dialogue
raised by Justice Scalia and others are not without basis. 199
Transnational judicial dialogue may have negative implications.
Nevertheless, the danger posed by this transnational judicial
engagement is not the adoption of foreign law that does not fit the
national circumstances. Most justices are familiar enough with the
national situation and legal environment to avoid that. The real
concern raised by transnational judicial dialogue is the possibility
199. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 6.
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that a court will lose touch with its national audience and allow a gap
to develop between its perception of its role and its audiences'
perceptions of this role. Therefore, the main concern that courts
cannot ignore is the possibility of a decrease in their social legitimacy.

